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ABSTRACT  
 
The interdependencies that exist between multiple infrastructures can cause unexpected system 
behaviour when their component failure occurs due to large disruptions and natural disasters 
such as, earthquake or Tsunami. The complexities of these interdependencies make it difficult to 
effectively recover infrastructure because of the several challenges encountered. To overcome 
these challenges, a research program called Disaster Response Network Enabled Platform (DR-
NEP) was initiated. This thesis deals with the modelling of electrical networks in order to study 
critical infrastructures interdependencies as a part of DR-NEP project through Western campus 
infrastructure examples.  
In the first module of the thesis, the concept and understanding of interdependencies is presented. 
For studying the infrastructural interdependencies, three infrastructures are selected at Western 
campus: electrical power system, steam system and water systems. It is demonstrated that 
electrical infrastructure is one of the most critical infrastructure as all other infrastructures are 
dependent on electrical input. This thesis subsequently presents the development of a detailed 
model of the electrical power system of Western campus. This model is validated with actual 
measured data provided by the Western facilities management for different loading conditions 
and different locations in the feeder. Such a model has been developed for the first time at 
Western University. This model can be used not just for studying disaster scenarios but also for 
planning of future electrical projects and expansion of facilities in the Western campus. 
The second module of thesis deals with different disaster scenarios, critical subsystems and the 
impact of appropriate decision making on the overall working of the Western campus, with a 
special focus on electrical power systems. The results from the validated electrical model are 
incorporated into the infrastructural interdependency software (I2Sim). A total of six disaster 
scenarios covering Western’s various infrastructure systems are studied; three involving 
electrical power systems in collaboration with water and steam systems, and the other three 
involving only electrical power system. The study of interdependency during disasters is 
performed to generate a wiser decision making process.  The results presented in this thesis are 
an important addition to the earlier work done in DR-NEP project, which only involved three 
 
 
iv 
 
infrastructures: steam, condensate return, and water. In this thesis, the information on electrical 
networks which was earlier missing is provided through the validated electrical power model.  
It is demonstrated that decisions to reduce electrical power consumption on campus by 
evacuating campus areas are effective in stabilizing the hospital operations, but not in 
maintaining Western business continuity. A decision to accommodate hospital activities 
according to power availability appears to be the better choice. The results presented in this 
thesis will help to pre-plan different preparedness strategies in a much better manner to deal with 
any future potential emergencies in the Western campus. 
Keywords: Infrastructure Simulators, Critical Infrastructure interdependencies, Disaster 
Response Management, Energy management, Integration Software architecture.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with electrical power system modelling for the purpose of studying the 
interdependencies between multiple infrastructures. This is part of the Infrastructure 
Interdependencies research being carried out at Western University in collaboration with The 
University of British Columbia (UBC) and The University of New Brunswick (UNB) for the 
Disaster Response Network Enabled Platform (DR-NEP) project. 
1.1 Background 
Our national security, economic prosperity, and national well-being are dependent upon a set of 
highly interdependent critical infrastructures. Examples of these infrastructures include the 
national electrical grid, oil and natural gas systems, telecommunication and information 
networks, transportation networks, water systems, and banking and financial systems. Given the 
importance of their reliable and secure operations, understanding the behaviour of these 
infrastructures, particularly when stressed or under attack, is crucial [1]. 
Natural or man-made disasters happen and can cause thousands of casualties. The Asian 
Tsunami on December 26, 2004 caused a total loss of 229,866 human lives [2]. Another 
unfortunate incident, Hurricane Katrina, which struck on August 23, 2005, was responsible for a 
total damage of $81.2 billion and a loss of 1,464 human lives [3]. In 2008, cyclone Nargis, in 
Myanmar, killed 140,000 inhabitants [3]. On March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami occurred 
in Japan resulting in loss of life of many inhabitants and economical damage to physical 
properties; followed by a nuclear crisis and shortage of electricity [4]. Researchers, keeping in 
mind the trends from history, have calculated the numbers of people affected annually by natural 
disasters up to 2007, as shown in Figure 1.1. These disasters have made the protection and 
restoration of critical infrastructures such as health care, utilities, transportation, and 
communication, a serious national concern. 
In natural or human-induced emergencies, it is clear that a series of carefully chosen decisions 
are vital in mitigating death and disaster, following a natural catastrophe such as an earthquake. 
These decisions must be made on the basis of sound knowledge and experience. However, given 
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that the worldwide frequency of such situations is fortunately low, and that the likelihood of the 
same command and control personnel encountering similar scenarios over and over again is slim, 
it can be appreciated that opportunities to build up the necessary experience are severely limited 
[5]. This is the context of this research work under which the decisions need to be carefully 
studied and measured before implementation. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: People affected by Climate-related disasters 1980 to 2007 (millions, Quarterly & Year-to-
Date Actual & Smoothed Trend) [6] 
1.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies 
The following subsections describe the definition of infrastructures and the need to understand 
the concept of infrastructural interdependencies. It also mentions the type of interdependencies 
and related research that has been done in past.   
1.2.1 Overview and Definition 
The study of infrastructure interdependency is a relatively new concept. As a result, the 
definition of infrastructures and the classification of interdependencies between them may not be 
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clear to many of us. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) defined infrastructure 
as [7]: 
“The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, 
institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable 
flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, 
the smooth functioning of governments at all levels, and society as a whole.” 
This explains that the infrastructures are not limited only to the physical buildings and lifelines. 
By this definition, infrastructures are an “interdependent” network, which leads to the question 
of what is the “interdependency” and how it is different from the “dependency” [1][7][8]. The 
civil infrastructure systems, such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, and water, have 
become so interconnected, one relying on another, that disruption of one may lead to disruptions 
in all [7][8]. Interdependencies can be classified into different types depending on their 
characteristics. 
The interdependencies are classified into four categories according to the nature of linkage 
between infrastructures as physical, cyber, geographic and logical [1][7][9][10]. Modelling 
interdependent infrastructures is a complex problem. Time scales, geographic scales, cascading, 
and higher order effects are some of the issues arising from, or related to infrastructure 
interdependencies that complicate analyses. These factors drive one to a multidisciplinary 
approach, and may in fact preclude the development of a single, all-encompassing modelling 
methodology (“one size fits all”) for analyzing infrastructures [1]. 
1.2.2 Literature Review 
Disaster situations such as natural disasters, failure of critical systems, or premeditated attacks 
within infrastructures might result in cascading effects. The dynamic and apparent nature of 
these effects drives the need to review literature on infrastructure interdependencies and 
simulations. Infrastructure simulation techniques can take one of two approaches [9], which 
include (1) integrated models, and (2) coupled models. The integrated models are designed to 
model multiple infrastructures and their interdependencies within a single framework. The 
coupled approach takes multiple simulations of infrastructure and connects them together [9].  
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Based on these approaches some of the modelling and simulation techniques (integrated with 
electrical power systems) include:  
 Petri-Net – A graphical and mathematical tool used to model the interdependencies of 
discretely distributed systems. It is comprised of places, transitions, and directed arcs 
(connecting places and transitions). Places contain tokens that are transferred between 
infrastructures to model their states. Petri-Net models have been applied to the modelling 
of interdependencies between multiple infrastructures including electrical power and its 
associated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system [11]. This tool 
presents the simple visualisation of interdependencies. However, the drawback of this 
approach is its inability to model quantitative information and perform scalability 
analysis under different damage states. 
 System Dynamics – A continuous integrated modelling approach known as system 
dynamics was developed which employs differential equations to model internal 
feedback loops and time delays that affect the behaviour of the entire system [12]. In the 
output, it creates a picture of how the system or infrastructure changes over time [12]. 
This technique has been used to study the effects of how policies and regulations are 
applied in multiple linked infrastructures including energy (electricity, oil, and natural 
gas), communication, transportation (waterways, highways, and rail), emergency 
services, banking and finance, agriculture, water, and shipping markets [1].  
 Cell-Channel Model – The cell-channel model is a unique modelling methodology used 
in The University of British Columbia I2Sim research. According to this research team 
[13][14], in the I2Sim implementation of a model, ‘service tokens’ represent the goods 
and services produced, consumed, and transferred in and between infrastructures. The 
entities that perform functions which produce and consume tokens are termed as cells. 
The means by which tokens can flow between the cells are termed as channels 
(representation of lifelines such as transmission lines). The cell-channel model is the best 
approach for mitigating disaster effects for large disaster scenarios through critical 
decision making [13]. The cell-channel model approach has been chosen to model and 
simulate critical interdependent infrastructures in this thesis. 
5 
 
 
 Agent-Based Model – This is one of the most popular approaches used for the 
infrastructure interdependency simulations. It consists of independent decision makers 
called agents who assess and react to the situations according to their own rules. 
Infrastructure models developed using an agent-based model include Critical 
Infrastructural Modelling Software (CIMS) developed by the Idaho National Laboratory 
[9][10][15], Critical Infrastructure Simulation by Independent Agents (CISIA) 
[9][16][17], and Next Generation Agent-Based Economic Laboratory (N-ABLE) by 
Sandia National Laboratories [9][18]. Electrical power is modelled externally in this 
model whereby the outputs of simulations act as inputs for agents who are responsible for 
final decision making. 
 Physics-Based Models – These models are pervasive in the modelling of certain 
individual infrastructure interdependencies. A wide variety of well-established tools are 
developed for modelling electrical power systems to various degrees of granularity in 
time. Modelling interdependencies between infrastructures with this approach in a non-
integrated fashion has also been attempted. However, it has not evolved as a popular 
method [7][19]. This is due to the fact that the amount of processing power required to 
run these models is high, while the level of detail yielded might not be necessary. 
Moreover, construction and operation of such models demands an expert knowledge, 
which is often difficult to obtain for simulations of wide range of infrastructures. 
All of these techniques have their own advantages and disadvantages. According to the 
requirements of the project, one of the above techniques is selected. The scope of this work is 
based on disaster management and the study of interconnection between various domain 
simulators and interdependency simulators. The software chosen should be able to serve the 
purpose of the research study. The decision making alternatives have to be suggested during the 
simulation of different disaster scenarios and the model has to provide the quantity and 
scalability of the nature for the system. For the DR-NEP project, according to team members, the 
most appropriate approach for modelling the system of the Western campus for various disaster 
scenarios is the “cell-channel model”. 
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1.3 Disaster Response Network Enabled Platform (DR-NEP) 
Project 
The Disaster Response Network Enabled Platform (DR-NEP) is a project carried out at three 
different universities in collaboration with two other research agencies. The participating 
universities and agencies are The University of British Columbia, Western University, The 
University of New Brunswick, ENEA (research agency) in Italy, and The Asian Institute of 
Technology (AIT) in Thailand. This research project is funded by Canada's Advanced Research 
and Innovation Network (CANARIE), along with support from IBM. The Disaster Response 
Network Enabled Platform (DR-NEP) is a system that integrates a set of independently 
developed infrastructure and disaster simulators.  
This section describes some of the architectural choices made for DR-NEP. The overall system 
uses a master-slave pattern, with one master simulator orchestrating all of the others, based on a 
central system clock. As the various simulators are developed by different organizations, they 
each have their own data models with data elements not matching one for one, or with different 
representations, and not useful for collaboration [20]. To integrate them into DR-NEP, and to 
avoid developing n
2
 distinct translators, a single common data model was devised, akin to the 
mediator pattern, and therefore only one data translator per simulator was needed [20]. 
Developing this common data model poses many challenges; containing the right abstractions to 
communicate with existing and future simulators, in particular the topology of their underlying 
models. It helps in reducing the overall complexity of the system, and also minimizes the 
likelihood of many drastic changes when the system will evolve [20]. For effective disaster 
response, the following are the three major steps [21]: 
 Visualization 
 Simulation 
 Decisions 
The DR-NEP project involved different stakeholders, including the Western team. The 
responsibility of the Western team members was to play the role of a local Emergency Expert 
Centre (EXC) regarding the simulation of a real-time disaster on its university campus. The role 
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of the Western team was also to make an operational and decision-making function in DR-NEP’s 
networked environment for the Western campus case, and development of a real-time scenario 
and analysis of best responses (with all stakeholders) [21]. 
1.3.1 Objectives of DR-NEP Project 
Modelling interdependent infrastructures is a complex, multifaceted, and multidisciplinary 
problem. So under the DR-NEP project efforts were made by the Western team to study, analyze, 
and understand the disaster events in the presence of different infrastructures.  
 
The research project has various objectives that are mentioned below [21]: 
 Simulation of operational scenarios and the state of critical infrastructure before, during, 
and after an emergency or disaster. 
 “Play” with distinct scenarios/strategies of operational decisions and resource allocation. 
 Support decision making of multidisciplinary teams during disaster phase. 
Under the DR-NEP project, the first and foremost step for the Western team was to develop a 
study case. In developing a study case, simulation models of all of the infrastructures were to be 
built using different software applications for various physical entities like water, power, and 
steam. Also, the study case needed to be built in the infrastructure interdependency simulator 
(I2Sim). The arrangement of software should be such that software applications representing 
different entities should be able to interact with interdependency simulator. Operating scenarios 
needed to be built for a disaster event and needed to be analyzed before and after the disaster 
event. Essentially, a proper decision support system needed to be developed in order to achieve 
the above stated objectives. 
1.3.2 DR-NEP as an Interdisciplinary Project  
As explained earlier, the DR-NEP project in itself is based on analysing and understanding the 
complexities of different infrastructures. Inclusion of different infrastructures results in 
involvement of experts from different areas who can perform exceptionally well in visualizing, 
simulating, and making decisions regarding different infrastructures during various disaster 
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scenarios. Graduate engineering students from different disciplines worked together under one 
roof towards achieving the goal of successful management of disaster events. 
At Western, graduate engineering students were involved from different areas to achieve the 
objectives of DR-NEP project. Graduate engineering students were involved from four different 
streams, which are mentioned below: 
 Software Engineering: The role of the graduate students from software engineering was 
to combine outputs from different software applications into a common software 
package: I2Sim. By combining the outputs, it allows output from any one of the software 
applications to be fed as an input to the I2Sim software, and feedback can then be 
provided to the originating software. 
 Electrical Power Systems: The role of the graduate students from electrical engineering 
was to model the electrical power network for the study case. It also involved load flow 
studies, fault studies, and load management skills. As an electrical power systems 
engineer, my role was to develop a validated electrical model of the Western campus for 
the DR-NEP team. 
 Civil and Environmental Engineering: The graduate students from civil engineering 
were involved in the project for modelling and simulating the water networks for the 
study case. Aspects of drinking water and fire hydrants had to be included while studying 
the disaster scenarios. 
 Communication Systems: The graduate students from communication systems 
engineering were involved in providing algorithms for communication between different 
software applications.  
Thus, the DR-NEP project was an overall interdisciplinary project, with personnel working from 
different engineering backgrounds. If any one of the disciplines was missing, it would have 
proved to be a big limitation towards the completion of the project. 
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1.4 Electrical Network Modelling 
Under the scope of this thesis work, modelling of electrical distribution network of the Western 
campus was a major task. Modelling the electrical networks involved making a simulation model 
of the Western campus, which should be validated with the actual data [22][23]. In this research 
work, the study case for disaster management studies is the whole of the Western campus.   
There are various steps to be followed in order to build the electrical network model of the 
Western campus. The initial steps were to gather the accurate data about the various electrical 
components to be used for the modelling. Then, the next step was to decide on the use of 
appropriate software applications according to the needs of the project. As the project was about 
disaster events and scenarios, there was also a need for different types of fault studies according 
to the nature of the disaster events. 
In electrical network modelling, typically three different types of studies are involved [24]. 
These three types of network studies are as follows: 
 Steady State Studies: It involves load flow studies [24] that give an idea about the flow 
of power in the network, the level of voltage available at different buses, and the 
conditions of feeders, whether they are under normal loading conditions or overloaded. 
Different software packages are available, such as PSS/E [25] and ETAP [26]. 
 Stability Studies: This type of analysis mainly deals with the short circuit studies. The 
short circuit studies are done for a short period of time, for example tens of seconds. 
Different software applications, such as PSS/E [25] and PSS Sincal [27], are available for 
short circuit studies.  
 Electromagnetic Transient Studies: These types of studies are done for very short 
periods of time, to the order of microseconds. Different software applications are used to 
study electromagnetic transients in the power network such as EMTP [28] and 
EMTDC/PSCAD [29]. 
In this work, steady state studies are performed on Western Campus electrical networks. Detailed 
modelling methodology for Western campus electrical networks has been presented in chapter 3. 
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Once the electrical network is modelled, efforts have to be made to validate the model based on 
the actual data acquired by various measuring devices. The validation of electrical network is the 
most difficult part if the data required for making the electrical network is not available. The 
methodology for validating electrical power network has been presented in detail in chapter 4. 
The last step is combining the results from the electrical model into the I2Sim model, which was 
developed by DR-NEP team members. In the end, the objective is to run the both software 
applications on same time scales and synchronize the results.  
1.5 Motivation of the Thesis 
It is clear that the delivery of goods and services to people through infrastructures is essential to 
modern society and that the systems of components constituting these infrastructures are large 
and complex.  In a case when a disaster has occurred, the delivery of goods and services is very 
difficult or sometimes even impossible. The delivery of services requires the efficient working of 
every infrastructure or subsystem involved in that particular infrastructure. 
During normal times, every infrastructure such as a power grid, a telecommunication system, or 
water systems, etc. knows very well how to respond to the problems in its own system and can 
send out repair crews or readjust operation [6][7][21]. Earlier, the disaster response plans were 
normally developed assuming the other infrastructures will be available. However, the opposite 
occurs during large-scale disasters; multiple infrastructures are damaged simultaneously and 
individual response plans are not sufficient [7][8][21]. For example, in March 2011, earthquake 
and tsunami occurred in Japan followed by a nuclear crisis and shortage of electricity [4]. This 
disaster scenario led to large destruction of physical and economical infrastructures affecting 
overall interconnected multiple infrastructures [4]. Major threats like tornados, earthquakes, or 
floods impose great disorder, and many times, human lives are lost. Therefore, it is important to 
prepare an emergency plan in advance, to respond during a disaster event and recover as quickly as 
possible after hazards have occurred.  
From the previous disaster events, it has been learnt that the study of inter-operability between 
multiple infrastructures is very crucial. Research work on identifying, understanding and 
analyzing these interdependencies is extremely important and has significant challenges. 
Realizing these facts, efforts have to be made in understanding these inter-relationships in a 
11 
 
 
better way, and to enhance decision-making during disaster events by doing significant research 
to overcome the challenges. The objective of the DR-NEP project was to develop effective 
decision-making tools, which will be used by policy makers and infrastructure service providers 
to maximize the number of human lives saved during natural or man-made disaster scenarios, 
which was a vital motivation for this study. Efforts have to be made to collect the information 
about power infrastructures, as electrical power is the most crucial infrastructure, and all other 
infrastructures are dependent on it.  
1.6 Objectives and Scope of the Thesis 
The work presented in this thesis is part of the study carried out under the DR-NEP project. The 
goal of this research is to use the cell-channel and other related methods to model 
interdependencies among electrical power systems and other infrastructures, to take them into 
account during the response and recovery stages of an emergency involving during different 
disaster scenarios on the Western campus. The main focus of this thesis will be on electrical 
power systems. 
The objectives and scope of this thesis are as follows: 
i. To develop an electrical distribution network model of the entire Western campus for use 
in disaster management studies. 
ii. To validate the developed Western campus electrical distribution network model by 
comparing the simulated model outputs with actual measured quantities. 
iii. To integrate the steady state study results of the validated electrical network model into 
the Infrastructural Interdependency Simulator (I2Sim). 
iv. To develop different disaster scenarios based on different infrastructures, in order to 
simulate different emergency situations with main focus on electrical power systems. To 
further understand and analyze the different disaster scenario resultsin order to 
accomplish the optimal decision making during any disaster situation. 
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1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 2 presents the basics of the infrastructural interdependency and the various 
subsystems involved. It then introduces the concepts of the infrastructural 
interdependency simulator, web-service, and basics of the Western disaster scenario case 
study. It also presents the significance of electrical infrastructure for the working of other 
infrastructures in overall study of infrastructure interdependencies. 
 Chapter 3 describes the methodology of modelling of different electrical components 
utilized in electrical power distribution systems with respect to the software applications 
used for simulation. 
 Chapter 4 presents a methodology to validate the electrical distribution model of Western 
University developed in EMTDC/PSCAD software. 
 Chapter 5 presents and analyzes three different disaster scenarios, with and without 
collaboration with other engineering disciplines, which were created at the Western 
campus. It then presents a discussion of the results and alternatives regarding decision-
making during the disaster scenarios. The results are presented with respect to electrical 
power infrastructure as the main focus of study.  
 Chapter 6 provides the conclusions and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPT OF INFRASTRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Modern society relies greatly upon an array of complex national and international infrastructure 
networks such as transportation, utilities, telecommunication, electrical power systems, and even 
financial networks [10]. The society also depends on the operations of civil infrastructure 
systems, such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, and water. These systems have 
become so inter-connected; one relying on another, that disruption of one may lead to disruptions 
in all [7][8][30]. As shown by the 1998 failure of the Galaxy 4 telecommunications satellite 
[1][7], the north eastern blackout in 2003 in USA [31], and many other recent infrastructure 
disruptions like the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011[4], what happens to one infrastructure 
can directly and indirectly affect other infrastructures, impact large geographic regions, and send 
ripples throughout the national and global economies [7]. 
Interdependencies are facilitated by advances in technology and driven by economics, causing 
them to become more and more commonplace [30]. With the advancements in technology, 
infrastructures are becoming more and more complex. The different infrastructures such as 
electrical power systems, communication systems, water systems, and transportation systems are 
often called as subsystems (system of systems) or lifelines [30]. All of the aforementioned 
critical infrastructures have one property in common—they are all complex collections of 
interacting components in which change often occurs as a result of learning processes. That is, 
they are complex adaptive systems (CASs) [7]. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates interdependencies between different subsystems. The concept of 
complexity and interdependencies of the subsystems can be understood well from Figure 2.1. 
There are five different planes in the diagram representing different infrastructures such as power 
systems, transportation systems, and communication systems. Each plane has several points, or 
sectors, starting and ending with an arrow. The spheres or point represent key infrastructure 
components within that plane. For example, the electric power infrastructure contains the sectors 
of electrical power plant, electrical generation and distribution, etc. Ties and dependencies exist 
14 
 
 
within each infrastructure between the different sectors. The arrows represent the infrastructure 
interdependencies. The example in the figure is a simple attempt to relate the complexity of 
dependencies that may exist between different components. In chaotic environments such as an 
emergency response to a catastrophic event, decision makers should understand the dynamics 
underlying the infrastructures.  
 
Figure 2.1: Interdependencies between different subsystems [10] 
When investigating the more general case of multiple infrastructures connected as a “system of 
systems,” it is essential to consider interdependencies. Infrastructures are frequently connected at 
multiple points through a wide variety of mechanisms, such that a bidirectional relationship 
exists between the states of any given pair of infrastructures. That is, infrastructure i depends on j 
through some links, and likewise j depends on i through other links [1][7][8][21]. So the 
infrastructural interdependencies can be bidirectional as well as unidirectional in which j does 
not depend on i through the same link. 
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This research work is carried out to study the electrical power systems of the Western campus for 
the purpose of understanding the interdependencies between multiple infrastructures that exist 
within the campus. The focus of this research work is to model the electrical power system of the 
Western campus and incorporate the results into the I2Sim model, which was developed by the 
DR-NEP team, along with other infrastructures such as steam, water and condensate return 
systems.  
In this chapter, the definition, concept, and understanding of interdependencies is presented 
along with their types. Section 2.3 and 2.4 of this chapter provides details about various 
subsystems in infrastructures and their interconnection techniques and analysis. Section 2.5 gives 
a brief idea about the interconnecting software I2Sim and its architecture. Also a new concept 
called web service and quality of service is presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 presents brief 
description of the federated critical infrastructure simulators. Section 2.8 describes Western 
disaster case study. Significance of electrical infrastructure in overall interdependency study is 
presented in section 2.9 followed by conclusions in section 2.10. 
2.2 Definition of Interdependencies 
In this section, the definition of infrastructure interdependencies and their types are discussed. As 
Interdependencies give rise to numerous challenges that do not exist in single infrastructure 
models, it is very important to discuss some definitions.  
Interdependency: A bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which the 
state of each infrastructure influences by, or is correlated to, the state of the other [1][10]. More 
generally, two infrastructures are interdependent when each is dependent on the other [7][9][11]. 
For example, the electric power grid and natural gas network are interdependent; Natural gas 
fuels many electrical generators, and elements of the natural gas infrastructure require electricity 
to operate. A disturbance in the electrical system can cascade into the natural gas system, and the 
loss of natural gas pressure can shorten the generation of electricity. So the term interdependency 
is conceptually very simple, as observed from the previous example. It also shows the 
connections between different agents in different infrastructures in a general system of systems. 
As the number of agents and infrastructures increases, the overall system complexity increases 
proportionally. Figure 2.2 illustrates the interdependent relationship among several 
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infrastructures. These complex relationships are characterized by multiple connections among 
infrastructures, feedback and feed forward paths, and intricate branching topologies [7]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Representation of interdependent relationship among different infrastructures [7] 
2.2.1 Types of Interdependencies 
Infrastructure interdependencies refer to influences that an element in one infrastructure imparts 
upon another infrastructure. Interdependencies vary widely, and each has its own characteristics 
and effects on infrastructure agents. Although each has distinct characteristics, these classes of 
interdependencies are not mutually exclusive. In the following text, four principal classes of 
interdependencies are defined and discussed in detail [1][7][10][31][32]: 
 Physical Interdependency: Two infrastructures are physically interdependent if the state 
of each depends upon the material output(s) of the other. Physical interdependencies arise 
from physical linkages or connections among elements of the infrastructures [1][10]. A 
physical interdependency arises from a physical linkage between the inputs and outputs 
of two agents: a commodity produced or changed by one infrastructure is called an 
17 
 
 
output, and one which is required by another infrastructure for it to operate is called an 
input [1][13][23]. For example, a transportation network and a coal-fired electrical 
generation plant are physically interdependent, given that each supplies commodities that 
the other requires to function properly [33]. Figure 2.2 illustrates the physical 
interdependency between transportation and electrical power infrastructures. 
 Cyber Interdependency: An infrastructure has a cyber-interdependency if its state 
depends on information transmitted through the information infrastructure [1][10][31]. 
The computerization and automation of modern infrastructures and the widespread use of 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have led to pervasive cyber 
interdependencies [33][34].  
 Geographic Interdependency: Infrastructures are geographically interdependent if a 
local environmental event can create state changes in all of the infrastructures. This 
implies close spatial proximity of elements of different infrastructures, such as co-located 
elements of different infrastructures in a common right-of-way [7][10][30]. For example, 
an electrical line and a fiber-optic communications cable slung under a bridge connect 
elements of the electric power and telecommunications. Traffic across the bridge does not 
influence the transmission of messages through the optical fiber or the flow of electricity.  
 Logical Interdependency: Two infrastructures are logically interdependent if the state of 
each depends on the state of the other via a mechanism that is not a physical, cyber, or 
geographic connection [1][7][10][31]. In other words, a dependency that exists between 
infrastructures that does not fall into one of the above categories [10]. Some examples are 
various policies and legal or regulatory regimes that can give rise to logical linkage 
among two or more infrastructures. For better understanding, an example is the power 
crisis that occurred in California in late 2000 [7]. 
2.2.2 Coupling Characteristics and Behaviour 
This section deals with the coupling and response behaviour of various infrastructures. There is a 
need to understand the characteristics of the couplings among infrastructures and their effects on 
infrastructure responses to perturbations or disturbances. A disruption in an infrastructure is said 
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to occur when one or more of the physical components, or one or more of the activities needed to 
operate a physical component cannot function at prescribed levels. Disruptions may or may not 
result in service degradation. Service degradation is said to occur when the service itself cannot 
be provided at its prescribed level [30]. 
From an analytic perspective, infrastructure interdependencies must be viewed from a “system of 
systems,” perspective. Failures affecting interdependent infrastructures can be described in terms 
of three general categories [31]: 
 Cascading failure: A disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a second 
infrastructure (e.g., the August 2003 blackout led to communications and water supply 
outages, air traffic disruptions, chemical plant shutdowns, and other interdependency-
related impacts) as illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
 Escalating failure: A disruption in one infrastructure aggravates an independent 
disruption of a second infrastructure (e.g., the time for recovery or restoration of an 
infrastructure increases because another infrastructure is not available). 
 Common cause failure: A disruption of two or more infrastructures at the same time is 
the result of a common cause (e.g., Hurricane Katrina simultaneously impacted electric 
power, natural gas, petroleum, water supply, emergency services, telecommunications, 
and other infrastructures) [3][31]. 
2.3 Subsystems in Interdependency Studies 
Modern society relies on the operations of a set of human-built systems and their processes. The 
set of systems that are investigated in all interdependencies related research are denoted to as 
civil infrastructure systems. There are several types of infrastructures and subsystems included in 
the infrastructures itself which arise while dealing with interdependencies and studying inter-
relationships between different subsystems. A subsystem is a set of elements that is a system 
itself, and is that is also a component of a larger system. The systems or infrastructures can be 
classified as follows: 
 Energy and Utilities  
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Figure 2.3: Failures in interconnected infrastructure system [35] 
 Communications and Information Technology  
 Finance  
 Healthcare  
 Food  
 Water Supply  
 Transportation (Road transportation, railway, air transportation, marine transport) 
 Safety  
 Government Services 
 Manufacturing  
Figure 2.4 illustrates that infrastructures cover a large number of sectors, including the national 
electric power grid, oil and natural gas production, transportation, and distribution networks, 
telecommunications and information systems, water systems, transportation networks, the 
banking and finance industry, the chemical industry, agriculture and food systems, and public 
health networks. 
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Understanding the operational characteristics and providing a sufficient level of security for 
these infrastructures requires a system-of-systems perspective, given their interdependencies 
[1][32].  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Representation of different subsystems in Interdependencies Studies [21] 
Instead of giving details about all the infrastructures, this section will present a discussion on 
selected infrastructures and subsystems which fall under the scope of this thesis.  
 Energy and Utilities: The energy and utilities sector includes electrical power, natural 
gas, oil production, and electrical power systems. Sufficient information for the electrical 
infrastructure for performing interdependency estimates can be collected easily. The 
electrical infrastructure has three major components for its operation. These are electrical 
power generation, transmission, and distribution. In this work, only the distribution 
systems are included. The communication infrastructure services play an important role 
in all three phases. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are 
necessary for the reliable operation of electrical generation equipment [36]. Energy 
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Management Systems (EMS) is important for transmission and distribution network 
management [37].  
 Water Supply: There are two important components in most water supply networks: the 
drinking water network and the waste water management network. In recent years, new 
systems have been built to monitor and manage water reservoirs and distribution 
networks using different kinds of sensors technologies [38]. There are three aspects to 
online drinking water network monitoring: monitoring of water sources, monitoring of 
water treatment facilities, and monitoring of the distribution network [38]. These 
monitoring concepts are related to those in the electrical infrastructure as everything is 
based on software based programs. All of these communication based systems are 
installed in modern water station control stations. Within the DR-NEP project, the water 
system of the campus was modelled with the help of simulator software called EPANET 
[39]. The simulation provides knowledge about water pressure at various points in the 
buildings, and also at the various fire hydrants installed on the campus. 
 Communications and Information Technology: Reliable operation of the 
communications based systems depends on effective service to many of their core 
components. These include software services (e.g. web server, email gateway, 
virtualization system, database system), low level operating system tools, protocol and 
device drivers, communication devices and links, and different supporting utilities (e.g. 
firewall, virus scanner, spam filter) [36]. Any typical organization that has a modern 
information system infrastructure has all of these services in use every day. From each of 
the core components, software services are crucial as, nowadays, each and every function 
is based on software applications.  
2.4 Interconnecting Subsystems 
This section discusses the interrelationships and interconnections between subsystems and 
infrastructures presented in section 2.3. The main focus will be on complex adaptive systems 
(CAS)[1]. Holmgren et al. [40] present issues in power control systems and the associated 
communication systems. Jha and Wing [41] develop a constrained Markov decision process 
method to investigate survivability within infrastructures systems that rely on computers and 
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computer networks. Haimes and Jiang [37] also presented a Leontief-based input–output model 
called the inoperability input–output model (IIM) that enabled the accounting for 
interconnectedness among infrastructure systems. However, this approach worked only at a 
macroscopic level, and was useful for vulnerability calculation; but it would be difficult to 
extend this approach to restoration activities. In a more recent work [42], Haimes and others 
continued the development of the IIM and its ability to measure economic impact among various 
sectors in the economy by analyzing both the initial disruption and the ripple effects. Carullo and 
Nwankpa [43] presented experimental studies in electrical power systems with an embedded 
communication system for the transmission of network conditions.  
Other CAS models, such as SMART II+ and SymSuite, have been developed to analyze large 
scale, interconnected infrastructures with complex physical architectures [31]. Argonne Labs is 
also developing a next generation drag-and-drop simulation building platform that offers a 
unique, comprehensive, and unified modelling environment with capabilities for developing and 
integrating dynamic physical systems models, agent-based simulations, real-time data flows, 
advanced visualization, and post-processing tools [31]. Broadly, five types of interrelationships 
between infrastructure systems have been identified [30] and are described below. 
 Input dependence: The infrastructure requires as input one or more services from 
another infrastructure in order to provide some other service. 
 Mutual dependence: At least one of the activities of each infrastructure in a collection of 
infrastructures is dependent upon each of the other infrastructures. An example of mutual 
dependence involving two infrastructures occurs when an output of infrastructure A is an 
input to infrastructure B, and an output of infrastructure B is an input to infrastructure A. 
An example of this type of dependence is electrical power systems and the railroad mode 
of transportation. Railways transport fuel for electrical generators and electrical power 
systems provide signals for useful operation of railways. 
 Shared dependence: Some physical components or activities of the infrastructures used 
in providing the services are shared. 
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 Exclusive OR dependence: Only one of two or more services can be provided by an 
infrastructure. Exclusive OR dependence can occur within a single infrastructure system 
or among two or more systems. 
 Collocated dependence: Components of two or more systems are situated within a 
prescribed geographical region. 
2.5 Interconnecting Software I2Sim 
People are largely dependent on continued services from interdependent critical infrastructures 
such as telecommunication, electricity, transportation, water supply, oil and gas networks, and 
financial services. A system of interdependent infrastructure sectors is highly nonlinear and complex 
in nature. To ensure stable and reliable operation of these interconnected infrastructures, it is 
important to know their interdependencies. Well-designed simulation frameworks can provide 
significant insight into the interdependencies of these interconnected networks [13]. In the DR-
NEP project, for the purpose of simulating all of the participating infrastructures together on a 
single platform, Infrastructure Interdependency Simulator (I2Sim) is used. This project is a 
combined effort between three universities and research agencies, thus major work regarding 
I2Sim was already done at The University of British Columbia under the guidance of Dr. J. Marti 
(UBC). In this section, the I2Sim system, its definition including its critical components, is 
explained. I2Sim’s critical components, cells, channels, and tokens are also described. 
2.5.1 I2Sim Definition and Overview 
The research objective of the DR-NEP project was to study the decision making processes in the 
context of critical linkages within multiple infrastructure networks and to develop better policies 
to mitigate disaster situations. The present volatile world situations combined with the rising 
trends of natural hazards have raised concerns for the smooth operation of these critical 
infrastructures. However, until now, only a few computational frameworks have been developed 
to assist researchers, decision makers, and infrastructure service providers to understand the 
operational characteristics of these infrastructures during disaster scenarios [21][44]. These 
frameworks and methods have already been discussed in Section 2.4. 
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Infrastructure Interdependency Simulator (I2Sim) software is based on a matrix partition-based 
technique called Multi-Area Thevenin Equivalent (MATE) [13][14]. The MATE model has been 
used for large scale real-time power system simulations and is an efficient alternative to the 
existing agent-based critical infrastructure simulation frameworks. Another distinguishing 
feature of I2Sim is that it is based on the cell-channel model, where interdependencies among 
different infrastructures can be represented through a formal technique based on the extension of 
the Leontief input-output model [37]. Figure 2.5 depicts the block diagram of working of I2Sim 
simulator. 
 
Figure 2.5: Block diagram of working of I2Sim simulator [14] 
I2Sim uses a cell-channel model where cells, channels, and tokens are the main modelling 
entities. Cells perform the function of transforming inputs to outputs. Tokens are units 
transported from one cell to another, and include entities such as electricity, gas, and people. 
Channels are links between cells through which tokens may flow, such as pipes, wires, and 
streets [13]. 
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2.5.2 The Cell-Channel Model 
The cell-channel model proposed by Dr. Marti, J. Hollman, C. Ventura and Jatskevich [45] 
captures physical interdependencies among different critical infrastructures using precise 
mathematical descriptions [13][44]. Components defined in the physical layer can interact with 
the decision making layer through an event forwarding mechanism. The model has the following 
five components [13][21]: 
 Cell: A cell is an entity that performs a function. For example, a hospital is a cell that 
uses input tokens, such as electricity, water, medicines, etc. and produces output tokens, 
such as beds served. 
 Channel: A channel is a means through which tokens flow from a generator cluster to a 
load cluster. 
 Token: Tokens are goods and services that are provided by some entity to another entity 
that uses them. These tokens can be water, electricity, medical supplies, etc. 
 Cluster: A cluster is a group of one or more cells (also called node). Clusters reduce the 
modelling granularity and give a mapping to the MATE model. Two clusters are 
separated in time or space and are connected by channels. Each cluster generates and/or 
consumes tokens [13]. In an electrical network, a token can be a generator or a motor 
which generates or consumes electrical power. 
 Control: These are distributor and aggregator units. They change their state based on the 
events received from the decision making layer. In terms of electrical power, the amount 
of power available for distribution can be changed with the help of distributor units.  
2.5.3 I2Sim System Architecture 
I2Sim (Infrastructures Interdependencies Simulator) is a tool used to achieve a time-domain 
simulation of disaster scenarios affecting large scale systems of infrastructures [13]. In particular, 
it is concerned with the simulation of both the physical layer and the human layer of 
infrastructures consisting of a large number of functional units [13][44][45]. A number of 
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modules are designed to support the functionality of the I2Sim simulator, such as the database 
and the visualization modules.  
The I2Sim simulator solves cell-channel model based infrastructure networks using the MATE 
solution algorithm [13]. The MATE algorithm is originally implemented in an OVNI (Object 
Virtual Network Integrator) power system simulator [13]. I2Sim extends the OVNI solution 
procedure for multiple infrastructure cases. The I2Sim framework can be described as time-
driven, discrete event simulation architecture [13], where simulation states change due to a 
sequence of chronological events. In the following section, the components of I2Sim framework 
and architecture are explained briefly in five different steps [13]. 
 Model of Cell, Channel and Infrastructure Networks: Cells and channels are the basic 
infrastructure elements that form the core of cell-channel model (Section 2.5.2). 
Examples of cells are different physical infrastructure entities that can include power 
houses, substations, steam-stations, and hospitals, etc.  
 Representation of Interdependencies between Critical Infrastructures: The 
interdependencies between different infrastructures are nonlinear relationships. To 
establish benchmark cases for I2Sim, UBC researchers studied interdependency among 
different infrastructures within the UBC campus for the last two years; and these results 
were discussed with Western researchers during the DR-NEP project [21]. 
 OVNI Solution Model: The design philosophy of OVNI simulation framework is to 
partition the solution of large scale power system networks into the solution of smaller 
subsystems plus the solution of the links joining the subsystems. 
 I2Sim Event Scheduling: The I2Sim solution model is extended from OVNI by 
introducing two types of decision elements: aggregators and distributors. The aggregators 
and distributors are linear elements in a power station cell, and the range of their values is 
between 0 and 1 [21].  
 I2Sim Solution Model: The I2Sim solution model, to some extent, is different from 
OVNI due to the differences between critical infrastructure networks and electrical 
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networks. The difference is also due to the introduction of the nonlinear blocks and 
decision elements in the I2Sim cell model. 
2.6 DR-NEP Infrastructure Architecture 
DR-NEP is an interdisciplinary project in which five different organizations worked towards a 
common goal. In this project, different civil infrastructures such as electrical systems, water 
systems, and communication systems were analyzed at UBC and Western with the help of 
different simulators. I2Sim was used as the common software for understanding and analysing 
the results from all other domain simulators.  
In this thesis, two different software applications were used with respect to the electrical systems. 
For the purpose of validating the electrical model, EMTDC/PSCAD [29] is used; for combining 
the results with I2Sim, PSS Sincal [27] is used, with the help of ENEA in Italy. Figure 2.6 
illustrates the DR-NEP infrastructure architecture in terms of the Western campus, showing the 
Western electrical systems, and the steam and water systems which were developed by DR-NEP 
team members. 
 Physical Entities Layer: The lower most layer in the architecture of integrating the 
subsystems is the physical entities layer. The words ‘physical entities’ are used for 
different lifelines or infrastructural physical quantities which are critical to the working of 
a domestic or commercial infrastructure. Examples of these physical entities or quantities 
are electricity, drinking water, steam, etc.  Without the physical entity, the survival of the 
infrastructure is not possible. With respect to the disaster scenario created on one of the 
buildings on the Western campus, the physical entities are mentioned in Figure 2.6. 
Knowledge and data about all of the entities was provided by the Western Facilities 
Management department. The data was converted into useful information by the various 
engineers and students from the different disciplines participating in the project. 
 Domain Simulators Layer: The second layer in the architecture of integrating the 
subsystems is the domain simulators layer. When studying the behaviour of 
interdependencies during disaster events, it is mandatory to get information about input 
and output data for various physical entities. 
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Figure 2.6: DR-NEP Infrastructure Architecture [21] 
For getting the exact input-output data information about the physical entities utilized in 
the lowermost layer, it is necessary to use domain simulators to model and simulate all of 
the physical entities such as  power, water, and steam. For the disaster scenario created on 
the Western campus, four physical entities were utilized. Three different domain 
simulators were also used to model the physical entities. PSS Sincal (Load flow 
simulator) [27] was used to model the power network of the campus. The water system 
was modelled using the software called EPANET [39] by a student from The Civil and 
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Environmental Engineering Department. The steam and condensate returns were 
simulated in MATLAB [46] based Simulink, jointly by team members. The contribution 
of this thesis was to make a detailed electrical model of the campus that can be used for 
the interdependency study. 
 Infrastructure Interdependency Simulator (I2Sim): The third layer after the domain 
simulator layer is the infrastructural interdependency simulator layer. This layer is the 
most important layer and the most crucial to the events. This layer deals with combining 
all of the domain simulators. Combining implies that all inputs and outputs from all of the 
domain simulators should be incorporated into the common software - I2Sim. The 
incorporation of inputs and results from domain simulators should be based on the same 
time steps and based on the same disaster scenario. It should be possible to manage inputs 
and outputs of domain simulators through one common channel or platform, i.e. I2Sim. 
This was the task of the entire DR-NEP team to make the I2Sim model. 
 Decision Layer: The fourth and uppermost layer is the decision layer. As explained in 
the previous section, the outputs of the physical entities from the domain simulators are 
fed into the common simulator I2Sim. The outputs of the physical entities are then plotted 
in the form of graphs. The next step is the decision making process, under which the 
demand management of physical entities has to be done based on the disaster scenario. 
Different demand management decisions are taken based on the availability or non-
availability of critical entities. The decisions are taken by team members in such a 
manner that the supply of physical entities has to be maintained above critical values to 
maintain the working condition of the infrastructure and to achieve the desired objectives 
during the disaster event. 
2.6.1 ENEA- Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l'energia e lo 
sviluppo economico sostenibile 
ENEA is the ' National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic 
Development (ENEA) [47]. Its activities cover the following topics: 
 Energy efficiency 
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 Renewables 
 Nuclear 
 Environment and climate 
 Health and safety 
 New technologies 
 Electric system research 
On these issues, the agency ENEA [47][48]: 
 performs basic research, mission-oriented and industrial skills using broad-spectrum and 
experimental facilities, specialized laboratories, and advanced instrumentation; 
 develops new technologies and advanced applications  
 disseminates and transfers the results encouraging their use for productive purposes; 
 provides to public and private high-tech services studies, measurements, tests, and 
evaluations; 
 conducts training and information tailored to increase the skills and knowledge of the 
public sector. 
ENEA provides a multidisciplinary expertise and vast experience in managing complex projects. 
ENEA is carrying out a project called MIMESIS (Multi Infrastructure Map for the Evaluation of 
the Impact of Crisis Scenarios) [49]. This project aims to build a Decision Support System (DSS) 
that, by coupling meteorological-climatic and geophysical predictions with the knowledge of all 
critical infrastructures in a given region, is able to provide a dynamic risk assessment of the 
elements of all critical infrastructures and to estimate the impact that a specific crisis scenario 
could produce [48][49].  
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The evaluation of the impact of crisis scenarios on critical infrastructures is performed through a 
simulative approach based on a distributed simulation platform that integrates a set of critical 
infrastructures domain simulators (also known as Federated simulation) [50]. 
In the context of the DR-NEP project, ENEA joined the CANARIE network in order to provide 
the critical infrastructures domain simulators services that are used by UBC and Western, to be 
integrated into the I2Sim simulation platform. On the other hand, ENEA will be using I2Sim to 
simulate crisis scenarios models that ENEA have developed in the research activity [21].  
2.6.2 Web Service  
A web service is an effort to build a distributed computing platform for the web [51]. Also, a 
web service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine 
interaction over a network.  
A web service is an abstract notion that must be implemented by a concrete agent. The agent is a 
piece of software or hardware that sends and receives messages, while the service is the resource 
characterized by the abstract set of functionality that is provided. For example, we can 
implement a particular web service using one agent one day (perhaps written in one 
programming language), and a different agent the next day (perhaps written in a different 
programming language) with the same functionality [47][48][49]. Although the agent may have 
changed, the web service remains the same.  
2.6.3 Quality of Service 
Quality of Service (QoS) is an index of a network which relates to its “technological” efficiency 
in delivering the required power load, expressed in terms of the operating conditions under 
which the network is called to operate [48][49].  
QoS is defined below: 
 
0 ≤ QoStech≤ 1 
Where, 
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N  =  the total number of lines 
Nol =  the overloaded lines (i.e. where a larger than expected power flows) 
Nd =  the lines which must be disconnected 
In the event that the QoStech is lower than a fixed threshold due to some failures occurring in the 
network, the operator should somehow reduce the electrical power available to the load points 
(e.g. through load shedding policies). To keep into account the quality of serviced perceived by 
the user, a new index QoSe is defined in terms of the difference between the delivered and the 
expected loads [48][49]: 
 
where Li are the loads expected to be supplied by the different “k” load points, and Li’ are the 
effectively delivered loads. MIMESIS performs a load reconfiguration on the different loads, 
aiming at maximizing QoSe and QoStech as well. 
2.7 Federated Critical Infrastructure Simulators 
The behaviour of each critical infrastructure can be observed and analyzed through the use of 
domain simulators, but this does not account for their interdependency [50]. To explore CI 
interdependencies, domain simulators need to be integrated into a federation where they can 
collaborate [50]. 
Under the DR-NEP project, members of the team explored three different simulators: the 
EPANET [39] water distribution simulator, the PSCAD/EMTDC [29] power system simulator, 
and the I2Sim infrastructure interdependency simulator. Each simulator’s modelling approach 
was explored and their similarities and differences with respect to the modelling approaches 
were determined. Core ontology for each simulation engine was created. Ontologies and their 
mapping will support collaboration of simulators by enabling exchange of information in a 
semantic manner [50]. 
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2.8 Western Disaster Case Study 
For the purpose of fulfilling the objective of the DR-NEP project, different disaster scenarios 
were created on the Western campus by the team members. For this study, the Western campus 
was divided into four different parts, or cells, namely A1, A2, A3, and A4 as illustrated in Figure 
2.7 [21]. 
Different cell divisions of the Western campus represent the following: 
 A1: South campus 
 A2: University community center & Social Science 
 A3: Central campus 
 A4: University hospital 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Cell division of Western campus for studying disaster scenario [21] 
The disaster scenarios were created in buildings in the different cells. There is a high voltage 
substation close to the building chosen for each event. For example, the south substation supplies 
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electrical power to the south part of the Western campus. The disaster scenario events are listed 
below. 
2.8.1 Disaster Scenario Events [21] 
1. Time of disaster event: winter time. 
2. Fire started in one of the building in the campus. 
3. Electrical substation is located very close to the selected building. 
4. Forced shut down of the high voltage (HV) substation due to fire. 
5. Three of the nearby fire hydrants were started. 
6. Starting of fire hydrants results in reduction of water pressure available for the campus. 
7. Leakage occurred in the condensate return system. 
2.8.2 Simulated Events [21] 
Below is the list of the controllable and uncontrollable events during the disaster event 
simulation: 
Uncontrollable events 
 Fire 
 Power, water, steam, and condensate return leakages 
Controllable events 
 Hydrants usage 
 HV substation operation 
 Steam production and distribution 
 Evacuating people 
2.8.3 Objectives of Disaster Scenario Simulation 
The disaster scenario was simulated using I2Sim software, with the following objectives, during 
the DR-NEP project. 
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 The critical task was to keep the University Hospital operational 
 The critical operational cell is the Power/Physical Plant where the electrical power and 
water pressure must be kept above the cut off level. 
 Electrical power should also be provided to keep the critical buildings operational 
 Minimization of human injuries and casualties 
 Speedy recovery (ensuring continuity of the campus activities) 
 Best utilization of resources  
2.8.4 Study Subsystems  
There are several types of infrastructures and subsystems included in the infrastructures itself 
which arise when dealing with interdependencies and studying interrelationships between 
different subsystems. In the disaster scenario case study of the Western campus, team members 
included the following subsystems:  
 Water System: Within the DR-NEP project, the water system of the campus was 
modelled with the help of simulator software called EPANET [39] by a team member 
from The Civil and Environmental Engineering Department. The entire campus water 
distribution system was modelled to obtain the desired values of water availability and 
pressure values. These values were calculated from the simulated model. Also, different 
disaster scenarios were modelled to get the optimum water availability values in case of 
emergencies. The output of the water networks is dependent on the type of disaster event 
and the availability of other infrastructures, such electrical power, which is necessary in 
order to run the water pumps and motors on campus. 
 Steam and Condensate Return Subsystems: These are two other subsystems which are 
directly related to water system. These two major subsystems are also modelled in the 
disaster scenario along with the water subsystem. During the disaster simulation, all of 
the water related components like the water treatment plant were simulated.  
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 Electrical Power: The second major subsystem used in this study along with the water 
system is the electrical power subsystem. The electrical power systems can be 
categorized into the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy. In the 
context of the Western campus, the disaster study mainly deals with distribution of 
electrical power. There are three main substations supplying power to the campus. Details 
regarding the electrical systems are provided in Chapters 3 and 4.  
It is clear from the above discussion that the disaster scenario simulated is based on four different 
entities. Every building is simulated on the basis of a combination of entities. The combination 
of entities can be called a function for a building, which involves different critical lifelines such 
as power, steam, water, etc., as below: 
 Physical Plant:  function (water, power, condensate return) 
 University Hospital:  function (steam) 
 Campus buildings:  function (water, power, steam) 
2.9 Significance of Electrical Infrastructure in Overall 
Interdependency Study 
This section presents the importance of electrical system modelling and the inputs provided by 
the electrical model, in the overall study of infrastructural interdependency. The outputs from 
various domain simulators for different entities such as water, steam, and electricity will be used 
as inputs into the interdependency software I2Sim.  
The following subsections provide details about the different infrastructure networks and their 
characteristics. In the end, the need for, and importance of, the electrical network study will be 
discussed in detail, followed by a conclusion.  
2.9.1 The Electrical Power Network 
The energy and utilities sector includes electrical power, natural gas, and oil. The electrical 
infrastructure has three major components for its operation. These are the electricity generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The working of an electrical infrastructure depends upon various 
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other infrastructures. For example, communication systems, such as Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA), systems are necessary for the reliable operation of electrical 
generation equipment [36]. Both Energy Management Systems (EMS) and SCADA systems are 
critical components in power system control centers, which are essentially based on 
communication infrastructure. 
Malfunction of the SCADA or the Energy Management Systems (EMS) system has a major 
impact on electrical energy generation and distribution [36][37]. However, these systems are 
normally well designed and carefully implemented. Thus, they provide reliable operation in 
normal operating conditions. In the case of emergencies, more than one infrastructure is 
involved. There is, therefore, a need to study all of the different infrastructures together during a 
disaster event. In terms of other infrastructures, all of the infrastructures need electricity to 
perform day-to-day operations. For example, all of the different infrastructures such as water, 
steam, etc., work on equipment like water pumps or motors which need electric power to 
perform their operation. To understand the importance of electrical power as a critical input, the 
water, steam, and condensate return systems are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
2.9.2 The Water Network 
There are two important components in most water supply networks: the drinking water network 
and the wastewater management network. There was a need to include the water systems in the 
interdependency studies, as water is an extremely crucial physical entity in the life of human 
beings. In a general sense, it is used for drinking and household purposes. But in the context of 
emergency services, water is used in fire hydrants for fighting against fire during a disaster 
event. Water is also used for generating steam, which is used as a heating source during the 
winter [21].  
At Western, steam is generated from water in the steam plant, located in the southern part of the 
campus. The steam produced is distributed to the campus buildings and to University Hospital. It 
was important to include this system in the interdependency studies as an incident had already 
occurred in 2006, in the steam plant. In 2006, during winter operations, Western’s steam plant 
experienced a failure in operations due in part to an unobserved anomaly in the municipal water 
supply [21][52]. The subsequent explosion, which disabled campus heating, caused building 
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closures and nearly resulted in an evacuation of a major hospital [21][52]. The representation of 
the campus municipal water distribution system was built with external stresses applied to 
produce system conditions equivalent to those during the failure. The water model was built in 
EPANET (water modelling software), by a graduate student from The Department of Civil and 
Environment Engineering. 
EPANET is a program that analyzes the hydraulic and water quality behaviour of water 
distribution systems. The EPANET Programmer's Toolkit is a dynamic link library (DLL) of 
functions that allows developers to customize EPANET's computational engine for their own 
specific needs [39].  
The campus has two feeders for water supply: the eastern and southern feeders [21].  Water is 
needed as an input on four parts of the campus as well as for University Hospital. The available 
amount can be evaluated by performing a water simulation study, similar to an electrical power 
simulation study. Then, the input is entered into the interdependency software, which in turn, 
provides information about relationship between supply and demand.  
The water model depends mainly upon the functioning of water pumps. The water pump takes 
water and electricity as inputs and the output of the pump is water with higher pressure. The 
water with high pressure is used to feed the boilers in the steam plant to produce steam during 
the winter. Thus, the electric power supply plays a crucial and life sustaining role in the case of 
water networks. 
2.9.3 The Steam and Condensate Return System 
The steam and condensate return systems are part of the water networks. In a broad sense, water 
systems are directly related to steam and condensate systems. During the winter, one of the 
major requirements is the availability of heat in the buildings, whether a residential building or a 
commercial building. In the case of the Western campus and hospital, both of these systems 
receive heating in the buildings by steam produced at the physical plant situated within the 
campus [21].  
To produce the steam for heating purposes, five boilers are installed in the physical plant [21]. 
To produce steam, water and electrical power are needed as inputs to the boilers. The boiler in 
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I2Sim is equivalent to the super heater that produces steam for the campus and University 
Hospital. Water is needed for producing steam, but it is noted that to provide steam and water, 
one common entity is required: an electrical power supply. 
The second physical quantity that is directly related to water is condensate return. Both steam 
and condensate return are related to water networks, as these three can be interchanged by simply 
varying the temperature of the physical entity. In the Western physical plant, all three entities are 
present for ensuring the university and campus activities remain operational.  
A condensate aggregator is used for adding all of the condensate return quantities from all the 
three buildings A1, A2, A3 (Figure 2.7) as well as the hospital building, which is pumped out 
using an electric motor or pump. Electricity is again used as an input in the condensate return 
system, as was used in the steam and water networks. 
2.9.4 Importance of Electrical Network Study 
Different entities were modelled in I2Sim for the DR-NEP project, but this section focuses on 
how important the input provided by the electrical network study in the overall system can be. 
Figure 2.8 depicts two different decision-making scenarios for distribution of electrical power on 
the Western campus during a disaster event.  
In Figure 2.8 four separate rectangles represent different physical infrastructures: 
 Electrical Power Substation  
 Water Station 
 Physical Plant  
 Hospital 
In Figure 2.8 out of four blocks representing infrastructures, the hospital is considered to be the 
most critical. For its normal working conditions, it needs different physical entities such as 
electrical power, water, and steam. If all of the entities are available above threshold value, the 
hospital is not considered as a critical infrastructure. During a disaster event the entities available 
can decrease below threshold values. These situations can be handled using optimal decision-
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making scenarios. Optimal decision-making depends on the appropriate distribution of available 
resources. This has been discussed in detail with examples as noted below. 
Figure 2.8 is presented to show two types of decisions during a disaster scenario.  These two 
types are described as follows: 
 Worst decision making scenario: In this scenario, the physical entities (electrical power, 
steam, and water) availability is zero for every infrastructure except for the hospital. 
During a disaster event the output of the electrical substation is decreased to 250 MW 
from 550 MW. Considering the hospital to be the most critical infrastructure, the 
available power (250 MW) is fed only to the hospital, leaving all other infrastructures 
without any electrical power input.  Thus, this decision resulted in the shutdown of the 
water station and physical plant, further resulting in zero water and steam supply for the 
Western campus and hospital.   
 
Figure 2.8: Power distribution decision making scenarios  
Worst Decision Making 
Optimal Decision Making 
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 Optimal decision making scenario: In this scenario, the physical entities (electrical 
power, steam, and water) are available for every infrastructure but in reduced quantities. 
During a disaster event, the output of the electrical substation is decreased to 250 MW 
from 550 MW. Out of the available 250 MW of electrical power, 100 MW is fed to the 
hospital, 100 MW is fed to physical plant and 50 MW is fed to the water station. Every 
infrastructure is receiving electrical power as input, which results in availability of water 
and steam for both hospital and the entire Western campus. This demonstrates a better 
and optimal decision-making scenario. 
Figure 2.9 depicts infrastructures as a function of different physical entities such as water, steam, 
and electrical power. The importance of power network modelling can be easily seen from 
Figure 2.9. Four different infrastructures are illustrated, which are within the scope of this 
research work. 
These infrastructures are electrical substations, the water station, steam plant and hospital. The 
symbols within the brackets show the physical entities on which a particular subsystem is based 
on. It is clear from the Figure 2.9, that every subsystem has one entity in common as input, 
which is electrical power. For efficient working of all the infrastructures electricity needs to be 
provided water station, steam plant and hospital.  
 
Figure 2.9: Infrastructures as a function of different physical entities (water, steam, 
electrical power) 
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For getting the knowledge about how much electrical power will be available during emergency 
situations, it is necessary to include power system modelling studies into the disaster response 
studies, as all of the infrastructures are dependent on electrical power.  
Thus it can be stated that, while all the network models are important for the disaster response 
studies, an indispensable network to be studied is the electrical network. Power is the only entity 
which is needed by all other subsystems. If a disaster response study is done without including a 
power network model as input, it is simply incomplete and inadequate. The electrical network 
study performed in this thesis is therefore vital for studying the different subsystems under multi-
infrastructure interdependency approach. 
2.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the concept of infrastructure interdependency is discussed in detail. All of the 
possible subsystems are discussed, but the main focus is on the subsystems that are under the 
scope of this research work. The principles of interconnection of these subsystems are presented. 
The main concept used for interconnection is a cell-channel based approach that is executed by 
the I2Sim software. I2Sim software architecture was presented along with the presentation of the 
DR-NEP software architecture. The interconnection of domain simulators and interdependency 
software I2Sim is based on software architectures Quality of Service Evaluator (QoSe) technique 
of measuring power quality based on fault studies during disasters is presented through the use of 
Web Services at ENEA Italy. The details of the disaster case studies for the Western campus 
developed under the DR-NEP project are presented. The significance of electrical infrastructure 
in overall interdependency study was also presented. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODELLING OF ELECTRICAL NETWORK OF WESTERN 
UNIVERSITY  
3.1  Introduction 
The concept of electrical power network modelling involves the understanding of the structure of 
power systems. The basic structure of electrical power system can be divided into three main 
subsystems: namely Generation, Transmission, and Distribution.  This thesis has its main focus 
on Western University Distribution Systems. Power distribution systems are considered as a final 
stage in delivering the power to consumer loads. The distribution systems generally consist of 
feeders, distributors and service mains. London Hydro is the utility, which supplies electrical 
power to Western University. The power voltage levels as defined by the utilities are medium 
voltage (MV) levels operating between 13.8 kV and 60 kV, and low voltage (LV) levels 
operating less than 13.8 kV. The incoming power feeders to the substations at Western are at 
medium voltage level, operating at 27.6 kV. Medium Voltage distribution can be further 
categorized as a radial type distribution network in which only one circuit is used to supply the 
consumer loads, and as ring type distribution network in which the primaries of distribution 
transformers form a loop [24]. 
The distribution system begins as the primary circuit and then leaves the sub-station and ends as 
the secondary service enters the customer's meter socket. Distribution circuits serve many 
customers. Distribution circuits are fed from a transformer located in an electrical substation, 
where the voltage is reduced from the high values and is used for power transmission [24]. At 
Western there are three main substations, each having two different transformers connected to 
different bus bars with same voltage level. 
In distribution systems, power may be carried through either overhead lines or underground 
cables. Also, only large consumers are fed directly from distribution level voltages. Most of the 
utility customers are connected to a transformer, which reduces the distribution voltage to very 
low voltage (120V-208V) used by lighting and household loads. The transformers used may be 
pole-mounted or set on the ground in a protective enclosure [24]. At Western most of the 
44 
 
 
distribution of power is carried out through underground cables. At each substation, two 
transformers are installed to step down medium level voltage (kV) to low level voltage (kV).  
In order to study the nature and different issues of the power distribution system, the electrical 
network is modelled using different simulation software applications. This chapter describes a 
detailed modelling of elements of the power distribution system at Western.  
3.2 Software Determination 
The first and foremost step while making an electrical power model is the selection of 
appropriate software. The software can be chosen on the basis of the requirements of the study 
that has to be done. The present research work is based on the modelling of the electrical 
network for the study of infrastructural interdependency. In this work, the software used for 
modelling should be able to predict different loading conditions during different disaster 
scenarios. It should be able to perform load flow studies [24] and predict the different voltage 
levels at different network levels. In disaster scenarios, the fault studies can generate valuable 
inputs for interdependencies studies. Thus, according to the above mentioned needs, two 
different software applications were chosen for modelling the electrical network of the Western 
campus. One is EMTDC/PSCAD [29] and the second is PSS Sincal [27]. PSS Sincal is 
appropriate software for load flow studies [24] and EMTDC/PSCAD can be used for fault 
studies, especially for temporary overvoltage and network transients. 
3.3 Modelling of Study System 
This section describes the modelling of the elements which are used during the electrical 
modelling of the study network. This section describes the modelling methodology used in 
section 3.3.1. The system under study is the power distribution network of Western University. 
The different subsections of section 3.3 explain the modelling of the substations, transformers, 
and cables, etc. with regards to both software applications used. 
3.3.1 Modelling Methodology  
 Softwares like EMTDC/PSCAD and PSS Sincal are commercially available for 
doing various electrical power systems studies. 
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 Various component models for transformers, motors and generators etc. are built- 
in the software and are utilized worldwide for modelling electrical power 
networks. The models for different components are internationally accepted and 
used globally. 
 Single line diagram for the Western campus was obtained from the facilities 
management at Western, which gives the information about the various 
components associated with Western campus electrical distribution networks. 
 Different electrical components of Western electrical distribution system network 
are modelled using the built-in models in the electrical power software 
EMTDC/PSCAD. By connecting different models, the whole electrical network 
of Western campus was modelled. 
 To make the developed model meaningful, it was necessary to put the accurate 
data for each and every component in the electrical network. Getting the accurate 
data was really a tough job. After a time period of more than four months, 
accurate data was compiled from Western facilities management and transmission 
and distribution handbooks. 
 Finally, the Western electrical distribution network model is developed using the 
accurate data for each component model in EMTDC/PSCAD. The next step after 
the electrical network modelling is to validate this model by comparing the 
calculated values with the actual values. 
The validation of the developed Western electrical distribution model has been done in Chapter 
4.  
3.3.2 System Description 
Figure 3.1 depicts the block diagram of the Western campus. The campus consists of three 
different substations that receive an incoming power supply of 27.6 kV. There is another 
substation that receives a power supply internally from other two campus substations. At each 
substation, step-down transformers are installed, which step down the voltage level to 4.16 kV.  
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram depicting the Western campus power distribution systems 
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Every substation has two step-down transformers, which can be seen as redundancy measures to 
meet emergency situations. Circuit breakers are installed between the bus bars, connecting the 
two transformers. There are other important components installed on campus such as fuses, 
capacitor banks, fans and boilers. 
Different components present in the above single line diagram are used in the simulation model. 
These are explained in detail in the following subsections. 
3.3.3 Substation Modelling 
The main component in any electrical distribution network is a substation where voltage is 
transformed to a lower level for local distribution [24]. A distribution substation transfers power 
from the transmission system to the distribution system of an area. Substations contain one or 
more transformers, and have switching and protection elements such as fuses and circuit 
breakers, voltage control elements, and power factor correction elements. At Western University, 
there are three substations at the north, south, and east ends of the campus. The input to these 
substations is provided by the local utility London Hydro. The input voltage to the substations is 
27.6 kV, which is stepped down further to 4.16 kV at all the three substations. There is also a 
fourth substation at the west end, which supplies two of the major buildings. The west substation 
is not really a substation in terms of incoming supply, as it is supplied power by two other 
substations on campus, instead of receiving power from the utility. The basic circuit of the 
substations at Western University is shown in Figure 3.2. 
At each substation, there are two types of bus bars on each side of the transformers. One is the 
high voltage (HV) bus bar, for which the voltage level is 27.6 kV, and the second is the medium 
voltage (MV) bus bar, for which the voltage level is 4.16 kV.       
In Figure 3.2, there are two different medium voltage bus bars which are connected through a 
power circuit breaker (2000 A), normally open. Each medium voltage bus bar is connected to a 
different secondary transformer. Also, each of the medium voltage bus bars supplies 4.16 kV to 
different buildings across the campus. Each of the buildings at Western has its own small step-
down transformers situated along the electrical power circuit, which steps down the 4.16 kV 
medium voltage level to 240/120 V low voltage level. The low voltage level is used to supply 
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power to different electrical equipment such as fans, lights, and computers in the various 
buildings. Each of the buildings can be supplied from two different substations providing a 
redundancy during an emergency or a disaster event.        
  
 
Figure 3.2: Single line diagram depicting details of north substation of campus [53] 
Figure 3.3 describes the modelling of the substation in EMTDC/PSCAD software. The incoming 
power supply from London Hydro is modelled as a voltage source with high voltage level. In 
actual simulation, a measuring device is used on the primary side of transformer for measuring 
active and reactive powers. Breakers are used for connecting and disconnecting power between 
bus bars, substations, and various buildings.  
49 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Substation modelling in EMTDC/PSCAD 
3.3.4 Transformer Modelling 
A distribution transformer is a static device constructed with two or more windings, used to 
transfer alternating currents by electromagnetic induction from one circuit to another, at the same 
frequency, but with different values of voltage. The purpose of a distribution voltage transformer 
is to reduce the primary voltage of the electric distribution system to utilization voltage [24]. 
Mathematically, for a transformer, the product of primary voltage and primary current is equal to 
the product of secondary voltage and secondary current. The transformers used in the Western 
University distribution network are typically the dry type, and step down voltage from 27.6 kV 
to 4.16 kV in the distribution substations as well as stepping down voltages from 4.16 kV to 
either 600 V or 208 V in campus buildings.  In the substations, the transformers are connected in 
a wye-grounded to delta configuration on a bus line which has a tiebreaker switch between them. 
This step up allows one transformer to take on the load of the other transformer in the event that 
one of the transformers requires maintenance and de-energization is required.  
The transformer model adopted for simulation in EMTDC/PSCAD and PSS Sincal for the study 
system is based on the theory of mutual coupling as illustrated in Figure 3.4 [29]. This concept of 
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mutual coupling is illustrated with the help of equivalent circuit of the transformer, as shown in 
Figure 3.5 [29]. 
 
Figure 3.4: Transformer model used for simulation in EMTDC/PSCAD [29] 
where, 
L11 = Self-inductance of winding 1 
L22 = Self-inductance of winding 2 
L12 = Mutual inductance between windings 1 & 2 
The voltage across the primary winding is V1 and the voltage across the secondary winding is 
V2. PSCAD computes the inductances based on the open-circuit magnetizing current, the leakage 
reactance, and the rated winding voltages [29]. 
 
Figure 3.5: Equivalent circuit of transformer model [29] 
L1 = L11– a* L12 
L2 = a2* L22– a* L12 
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Using the above methodology, all transformers are modelled for the study system. At each 
substation, two transformers are installed to step down the distribution voltage. In addition, 
transformers are used to further step down voltage to supply power to buildings from the 
substation. But in the study system, these transformers are not modelled at building level to 
avoid complexity.  
3.3.5 Underground Feeders 
An underground feeder is a buried power cable system used to distribute power to consumers. 
Western University utilizes the underground feeder system to distribute power to various 
buildings across the campus. There are two types of cables used in the study system depending 
upon voltage levels. The standard cable used for 27.6 kV side is 750 MCM overhead aluminum 
cables with an ampacity rating of 385 A, and with a temperature rating of 75 
O
C. However, for 
the 4.16 kV side, a 500 MCM underground copper cable system with an ampacity rating of 380 
A and a temperature rating of 75 
O
C is used. The reason for using copper cables on the secondary 
side, instead of aluminum, is that secondary side currents are higher and copper offers less 
resistance than aluminum. The high conductivity of copper allows for the easy passage of 
electricity without heating the wire [54]. Copper wiring is three times heavier than identical 
aluminum wiring. As such, depending upon the requirement of the study system, an underground 
cable can be used. Both the copper and aluminum cables used are illustrated through pictures in 
Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6: Aluminum and copper cables used for underground feeders [54]  
  
In PSCAD the cables are modelled using standard pi-section models, as they are suitable for very 
short lines where the traveling wave models cannot be used as shown in Figure 3.7. Coupled pi-
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section in PSCAD is formed by user defined values for lumped R, L, C elements. Overhead lines 
or cables are presented as series reactance, resistance, and shunt admittance (Line charging 
capacitance). Accurate data for the cables was obtained from the Westinghouse transmission and 
distribution book [55].  
 
Figure 3.7: Coupled pi model used for underground feeders in EMTDC/PSCAD [29] 
In order to obtain the feeder lengths of the network, an updated AutoCAD [53] map of the 
Western distribution underground network was used. The AutoCAD map was obtained from 
engineering facilities at Western who assured that the scaling of the components and distances 
was accurate. AutoCAD possesses tools that can measure the exact lengths between two points 
on a map using the accompanying scaling legends. The initial step was to determine the exact 
location of each building’s electrical room with the AutoCAD map. Feeder lengths were 
calculated as the distance between the electrical rooms for each building or substation, depending 
on the type of connection. The distances were measured using AutoCAD map and the data is 
provided in Appendices D and F.  
3.3.6 Circuit Breaker 
A circuit breaker is an automatically operated electrical switch designed to protect an electrical 
circuit from damage caused by overload or short circuit [24]. The circuit breaker can also be 
defined as a piece of equipment that can 
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 Make or break a circuit, either manually or by remote control, under normal conditions 
 Break a circuit automatically under fault conditions 
Thus, a circuit breaker incorporates manual (or remote control) as well as automatic control for 
switching functions. The latter control employs relays and operates only under fault conditions. 
In the study system, circuit breakers are used in modelling both buildings and substations. As a 
redundancy every building can receive a power supply from two or more substations, so there is 
a switching phenomenon going on routinely in day-to-day operations. Thus circuit breakers are 
used in the simulation of study case, which is modelled in both PSCAD and PSS Sincal, to create 
the different scenarios.  
There are different methods for representing a simple switching element in time domain 
simulation programs. The most accurate approach is to represent them as ideal that possesses 
both a zero resistance in the ON state and an infinite resistance in the OFF state [29]. Figure 3.8 
illustrates a simple RLC network. In this diagram let the resistance R12 represent a simple switch. 
If R12 is considered ideal, then two different networks can result, depending on the state of the 
switch. These two states of the switch are ON and OFF states. When R12 is connected, the switch 
is in ON state and in OFF state if R12 is disconnected. 
 
Figure 3.8: RLC equivalent network in EMTDC/PSCAD [29] 
In EMTDC/PSCAD, simple switching devices are represented as a variable resistor, possessing 
an ON resistance and an OFF resistance. Although this type of representation involves an 
approximation of both the zero resistance (ON) and an infinite resistance (OFF) of an ideal 
switch, it is advantageous in that the same circuit structure can be maintained, and the electric 
network will not need to be split into multiple networks, as a result of each switching event [29].   
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3.3.7 Modelling of Buildings (Load) 
The term 'load' refers to customer equipment that needs electrical power to operate. In the 
campus study case, various buildings represent different kinds of loads. The load of the campus 
is different during different time periods during the day. For example, the load at night is much 
lower than the load at daytime. Also, load affects the performance of circuits that provide output 
voltages or currents, such as sensors, voltage sources, and amplifiers. When a high power 
appliance in the campus building is switched on, it reduces the load impedance. Also every time 
a new department or building comes into the picture, it leads to the addition of new load which 
impacts the bus voltage. It, therefore, becomes necessary to perform the load flow analysis for 
existing loads and plan the future addition of loads.  
Figure 3.9 shows the original configuration of the buildings, as provided by the Physical Plant 
personnel. The loads are modelled as constant power load. Two buildings or loads are separated 
by a power circuit breaker. For the distribution of electricity, cables are used in the simulation, 
which is equivalent to a “pi” circuit model of transmission line. The data for the power cables is 
taken from Westinghouse Transmission and Distribution (T&D) book [55]. Figure 3.10 presents 
a network segment model EMTDC/PSCAD software. It shows how these buildings are modelled 
in EMTDC/PSCAD. These buildings are modelled as a single node and a single load. 
  
 
Figure 3.9: Single line diagram of student services buildings and health science building [53] 
55 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Software simulation subset of Western campus in EMTDC/PSCAD 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the description of the major components of the electrical system 
model of the Western campus. The modelling of these components in both EMTDC/PSCAD 
software and PSS Sincal software are described. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VALIDATION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEM MODEL OF 
WESTERN UNIVERSITY 
4.1 Introduction 
The Western University electrical distribution system is modelled for performing the 
infrastructural interdependency studies. The University campus receives an incoming power 
supply from the local utility, London Hydro. For the validation of interdependency studies, it is 
important that the infrastructures participating in these studies should be correctly modelled. This 
chapter deals with the validation of the electrical system model so that its outputs can be reliably 
used for the DR-NEP project studies. For validating the electrical system model, 
EMTDC/PSCAD [29] software is used for simulation of various substations and buildings.  
In this chapter, three different scenarios are investigated for the validation of the campus 
electrical system model. These scenarios deal with three different power levels during different 
time periods during the day, in a week when the power goes from minimum level to peak level. 
For this purpose, a single line diagram of the campus electrical systems is taken from the 
Western Facilities Management website. The data for the validation is also provided by the 
Western Physical Plant. This validated model will be useful for studying different disaster 
scenarios. Various faults can be created to represent the disaster, and analysis can be done with 
respect to the objectives of this work. In the next section the methodology used for validation 
will be described.  
4.2 Methodology for Validation 
To best demonstrate the reliability of the campus power system during a disaster, the worst case 
scenario has to be identified and selected. This worst case scenario corresponds to the maximum 
loading condition (highest power consumption) that has occurred in the past. This way, by 
simulating for the worst case scenario we could see how system would react in extreme 
conditions during a natural disaster. A historical study of the overall trend on each of the 
building and substation was done including the seasonal load data that Western Facilities 
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Management provided. It is seen that peak power demands occur mainly during the months of 
January and July. 
January has a high power demand due to fact that it is one of the coldest months and students are 
returning from a holiday break. For this reason, electricity consumption trends are much higher 
as compared to other months. July has been historically the hottest month and the increase in 
electricity use is primarily caused by the increased usage of the campus chillers. Both cases 
present equal likelihood of a worst-case scenario in terms of total power consumptions. 
In this research work, for validating the model, three scenarios have been selected for steady 
state analysis in EMTDC/PSCAD. Each of these three case studies has the same system diagram, 
but different data is used for the load flow studies. These three case studies represent different 
loading conditions of the Western campus electrical systems, as follows: 
 Peak Load Conditions 
 Light Load Conditions 
 Medium Load Conditions 
 
For all the three loading conditions, following steps were followed for validation. 
 
 Once the model was developed in EMTDC/PSCAD, the model is executed for getting the 
values of different electrical quantities. 
 For all the three different loading condition, active power (P), reactive power (Q) and 
voltage (V) values are calculated from the model developed in EMTDC/PSCAD. 
 For each of the three loading conditions, the values for different electrical quantities were 
calculated at three different locations, start, middle and end of the feeder. 
 The actual measured values for same electrical quantities (P, Q and V) were obtained 
from the Western facilities. 
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 Comparison is done between the actual and measured values obtained from 
EMTDC/PSCAD. 
 For the validation, the values for three different electrical quantities (P, Q and V) are 
compared and percentage error is calculated for nine different cases. 
4.2.1 Peak Load Conditions 
For modelling the peak load conditions, the data provided by the campus physical plant was 
studied and analyzed. The data provided for all three substations was studied on a weekly basis, 
analyzing the trends of different days of the week. Physical Plant personnel also provided data 
for all of the different buildings on the Western campus, from the year 2002 to present. After 
analysis, it was observed that different weeks of a particular month had a common trend from 
Monday to Sunday. For the majority of the weeks, the load of campus reaches its peak value for 
Mondays and then the load gradually decreases day by day as the weekend approached. The peak 
value on a particular Monday was observed as 22.9 MW. Figure 4.1 presents a typical total 
power curve for the Western campus for a particular week in 2011. It illustrates that the campus 
uses more power during the day as compared to night time.  
The seven peaks in the Figure 4.1 represents seven days of a week. The first peak represents 
Monday and the last two lowest peaks represent Saturday and Sunday.  Another factor, which 
was included, is the concept of critical buildings and critical electrical devices that require 
electrical power 24 hours per day. The critical buildings of the campus include the power plant, 
the hospital, medical science building, animal care, etc. As such, it was made sure that during the 
modelling of campus, critical buildings should receive power above the threshold value. The data 
used for the modelling of the Western campus during peak load conditions is provided in 
Appendix A.  Table 4.1 represents the buildings which have a peak load, more than 5 MW. 
4.2.2 Light Load Conditions 
The second scenario used for validating the campus electrical model corresponds to the light load 
conditions. The light load scenario was determined by analysing the total substation data, which 
is the combination of north, south, and east substations. The basic concept of analyzing the data 
remains the same as in peak load conditions. As explained in Section 4.2.1, different weeks of a 
particular month had a common trend from Monday to Sunday.  
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Figure 4.1: Typical total power curve for Western campus for a particular week in 2011                    
(On x-axis 0-7 represents Monday to Sunday). 
Table 4.1: Campus buildings having peak load more than 5MW 
Serial Number Building Name Average Peak Load (KW) 
1 Social Science 1833.8194 
2 West Valley 942.2667 
3 Support Services 881.3778 
4 Recreation Centre 722.6389 
5 Medical Science 670.3364 
6 Spencer Engineering Building 654.0648 
7 Dental 614.1991 
8 Weldon 599.1821 
9 Biotron 572.3241 
10 University Community Centre 556.1389 
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For all of the weeks, the load of campus reaches its lowest value for nighttime mainly on 
Wednesday and Thursday, during the weeknights. For the light load case study, the simulation 
diagram remains the same, but the data is different, which is provided in Appendix B. Also, one 
of the major worst load conditions was observed in November 2011 for approximately two 
weeks. This is the incident when the south substation was shut down for roughly two weeks and 
the north substation was compensating for the closing of the south substation.  
4.2.3 Medium Load Conditions 
The third scenario used for validating the campus electrical model relates to medium load 
conditions. Both the building and substation data was analysed to determine the appropriate 
medium loading conditions. By analyzing different maximum and minimum loading conditions, 
an average value for medium loading conditions was obtained. In addition, the corresponding 
loading conditions were obtained from the building load data provided by the physical plant. In 
actual practice, medium load conditions represent the late afternoons and early evenings during 
the weekdays. Also, at times the medium loading conditions can be represented by the peak load 
values during Saturdays and Sundays. In this scenario, the same system diagram is utilized 
during the simulation except with changed load values, as provided in Appendix C.  
4.3 Simulation Results 
In this section, the simulation results of steady state analysis of the Western campus electrical 
systems are presented. These results are divided into three subsections based on three case 
studies selected for validation of the Western campus electrical system. In support of the 
validation of the three case studies, appropriate graphs and tables are presented. Different 
comparison techniques are used to find the percentage error between the actual and simulated 
results. The results are validated under the following assumptions: 
 The load power factor for the simulation is assumed to be 0.9 lagging. 
 The data for some of the residence buildings are calculated based on the assumption that 
an increase in load of one building has the same ratio as the increase in the load of 
another residence building with almost same load in 2002. For example: Saugeen Hall 
residence had data from 2002-2006, but Perth Hall residence had data for all years from 
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2002-2011. So, the data for Saugeen Hall is calculated based on the assumption that the 
ratio of the increase of load is same for both the halls. 
 Some of the building loads are added together as one if the connection data is missing in 
the single line diagram provided by Facilities Management. For example, in the single 
line diagram of the Western campus, if the connection data between any two closely 
situated buildings is missing, the load data for both buildings is added together and 
presented as one building in the simulation.  
 Every building on the Western campus can be supplied power by two different 
substations. Facilities Management did not provide the connection data for a particular 
building to a substation for a particular time of the day. Thus, the connection of a 
particular building has been done keeping in mind the historical load distribution values 
of different substations. For example, the Weldon Library building can be supplied power 
by both the north and south substations. However, as per historical data, in the simulation 
diagram, Weldon Library is receiving its power supply from the south substation. 
According to the data provided by Facilities Management for the three different substations, 
graphs have been plotted depicting the actual measured data by the substation meter. 
A large set of data was provided by Facilities Management in an Excel spreadsheet. This data 
was sorted according to the needs of the study. The relevant data was then plotted, with the help 
of MATLAB software [46]. For generating the data, a code was written in MATLAB, and is 
provided in Appendix E. 
The data provided gave information about the active power consumed by the all three 
substations.  Information was also provided about the power factor, currents on the secondary 
sides of the transformers, and voltage on secondary side of the transformers. To obtain the total 
data values for the entire campus, data for the individual substations was added manually.   
Figure 4.2 depicts the actual active power consumed by the entire Western campus. Figure 4.3 
depicts the actual active power consumed by individual substations during a particular week. The 
week that has been selected measures the average peak loading of the campus. The peaks of the 
seven curves in Figure 4.2 represent the maximum load during the day for all seven days of the 
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week. For example, on the x-axis, Monday starts from value 0 and ends on value 1 and from 1 
onwards the load curve starts for Tuesday, which ends at 2. According to Figure 4.2, the peak 
loading of the Western campus occurs on a typical Monday and is around 22.84 MW. Among the 
individual substations, the south substation supplies the largest power, as seen in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.4 presents the total actual reactive power for the individual substations on the Western 
campus. As meters cannot measure reactive power, the reactive power was calculated using the 
power triangle illustrated in Figure 4.5. When the active power is known, using a power factor of 
0.9, reactive power can be calculated. The power factor in all of this research work is assumed to 
be 0.9.   
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Figure 4.2: Total actual active power measured at Western substations (On x-axis 0-7 
represents Monday to Sunday). 
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Figure 4.3: Individual actual active power measured at three substations in Western 
campus (On x-axis 0-7 represents Monday to Sunday). 
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Figure 4.4: Total actual calculated reactive power for three Western substations              
(On x-axis 0-7 represents Monday to Sunday). 
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Figure 4.5: The power triangle [24] 
4.3.1 Peak Load Conditions 
The model of the Western campus is implemented for steady state analysis by the 
electromagnetic transient software EMTDC/PSCAD. In order to validate the campus electrical 
model, three different loading conditions have been simulated. This section deals with model 
validation using the simulated results for peak loading conditions. For this purpose, the values of 
voltage, active power, and reactive power are compared at the start of the feeder, middle of the 
feeder, and at the end of the feeder, with the help of graphs and tables.  
The data recorded or measured by Facilities Management personnel have been plotted using 
MATLAB [46] software. The simulated results are transferred from EMTDC/PSCAD to 
MATLAB in order to get similarity in graphs, as plotted for the actual data. These graphs are 
compared with respect to the total active and reactive power flow for the Western campus. 
Graphs are also plotted individually for all three substations that collectively supply electrical 
power to the campus.  
The actual data has already been presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 which provide the actual 
readings of active and reactive power of all three substations. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 presented the 
peak power demand for the seven days in a week. However, Figure 4.6 plots the maximum 
power over the entire week. For validating the results, comparison of the highest peak (Monday) 
in Figure 4.2 is done with the maximum value depicted in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: Simulated total power consumption during peak loading conditions  
This comparison is done at three different locations in the simulation model. The three different 
locations are:    
 Start of Feeder 
 Middle of Feeder 
 End of Feeder 
Table 4.2 presents the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for peak loading 
conditions with error calculation at the start of the feeder. Table 4.3 presents the comparison of 
measured and simulated quantities for peak loading conditions, with error calculation at the 
middle of the feeder. Table 4.4 presents the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for 
peak loading conditions with error calculation at the end of the feeder. 
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for peak loading conditions                 
at start of feeder 
                    Start of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.654 0.642 1.835% 
Reactive Power 0.317 0.311 1.893% 
Voltage 0.988 0.995 0.697% 
Table 4.3: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for peak loading conditions      
at middle of feeder 
Middle of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.410 0.394 3.902% 
Reactive Power 0.199 0.191 4.070% 
Voltage 0.979 0.988 0.959% 
Table 4.4: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for peak loading conditions 
at end of feeder 
End of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.070 0.066 4.686% 
Reactive Power 0.034 0.032 4.765% 
Voltage 0.971 0.985 1.399% 
It is noted that the simulated values of real power, reactive power, and voltage match very well 
with the measured values, with an error less than 5%, which is within acceptable limits. This 
validates the EMTDC/PSCAD model of the Western campus for peak loading conditions. 
4.3.2 Light Load Conditions 
The simulations for the light load conditions are done with the same EMTDC/PSCAD model but 
with different load values. The actual values for the light loading conditions were calculated with 
the help of data provided by Facilities Management. The curves were plotted for actual active 
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and reactive power with the help of a MATLAB program that is provided in Appendix E. Figure 
4.7 depicts the total actual active power consumption over different days of the week (Monday to 
Sunday) on the Western campus. It also illustrates the light loading conditions for a typical week. 
The seven dips in Figure 4.7 show the nighttime power loading from Monday to Sunday. The 
lowest dip in the graph occurs on Wednesday night with respect to light loading conditions. The 
actual value of active power during light loading conditions is 13.65 MW.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
X: 13.16
Y: 13.65
Time (Days)
P
o
w
e
r 
(M
W
)
 
Figure 4.7: Total actual power consumption during light loading conditions  
(On x-axis 0-7 represents Monday to Sunday). 
Figure 4.8 depicts both active and reactive power values for a particular time of night on the 
Western campus during light loading conditions. In contrast to the seven dips in Figure 4.7, 
which represent the seven days of a week from Monday to Sunday, Figure 4.8 has only one 
quantity which represents the value of light loading conditions observed on a Wednesday night.  
For light loading conditions, a comparison of the actual measured quantities is done with 
simulated quantities at three feeder locations in the simulation model. These three locations are 
start, middle, and end of the feeder. 
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Figure 4.8: Total simulated power consumption during light loading conditions 
Table 4.5 presents the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for light loading 
conditions with error calculation at the start of the feeder. Table 4.6 presents the comparison of 
measured and simulated quantities for light loading conditions with error calculation at the 
middle of the feeder. Table 4.7 presents the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for 
light loading conditions with error calculation at the end of the feeder. 
 
Table 4.5: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for light loading conditions                 
at start of feeder 
Start of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.392 0.386 1.531% 
Reactive Power 0.190 0.186 1.684% 
Voltage 0.988 0.997 0.930% 
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Table 4.6: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for light loading conditions                 
at middle of feeder 
Middle of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.024 0.023 2.724% 
Reactive Power 0.119 0.115 3.025% 
Voltage 0.979 0.994 1.521% 
 
Table 4.7: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for light loading conditions                 
at end of feeder  
End of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.042 0.040 3.357% 
Reactive Power 0.020 0.019 3.400% 
Voltage 0.971 0.992 2.120% 
 
It is noted that the simulated values of real power, reactive power, and voltage match very well 
with the measured values, with an error less than 5%, which is within acceptable limits. This 
validates the EMTDC/PSCAD model of the Western campus for light loading conditions. 
4.3.3 Medium Load Conditions 
The simulation for the medium load conditions is done with the same system model as both the 
light and peak loads, but with different data values. The actual loading values for the medium 
loading conditions were calculated with the help of data provided by Facilities Management. The 
curves were plotted for actual active and reactive power, with the help of a MATLAB program 
provided in Appendix E. Figure 4.9 depicts the total actual active power consumption over 
different days of the week (Monday to Sunday) on the Western campus. The seven peaks and 
dips in the Figure 4.9 shows the daytime and nighttime power loading, from Monday to Sunday 
respectively. 
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Figure 4.9: Total power consumption during medium loading conditions 
(On x-axis 0-7 represents Monday to Sunday). 
For modelling the medium loading conditions, an average value in between the maximum and 
minimum values was chosen from Figure 4.9. The medium loading values normally represent the 
late evening or early morning time of the day. The actual value of active power during medium 
loading conditions is obtained as 18.27 MW.  
Figure 4.10 depicts both active and reactive power values for a particular time: a Tuesday 
evening on the Western campus during medium loading conditions. In contrast to the seven 
peaks and dips in Figure 4.9, which represent the seven days of a week from Monday to Sunday, 
Figure 4.10 have only one quantity, which represents the value of medium loading conditions 
observed on a Tuesday evening.  
For medium loading conditions, comparison of actual measured quantities is done with simulated 
quantities at three feeder locations in the simulation model. These three locations are the start, 
the middle, and the end of the feeder. 
71 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Simulated total power consumption during medium loading conditions 
Table 4.8 depicts the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for medium loading 
conditions with error calculation at the start of the feeder. Table 4.9 depicts the comparison of 
measured and simulated quantities for medium loading conditions with error calculation at the 
middle of the feeder. Table 4.10 depicts the comparison of measured and simulated quantities for 
medium loading conditions with error calculation at the end of the feeder. 
Table 4.8: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for medium loading 
conditions at start of feeder 
Start of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.523 0.512 2.103% 
Reactive Power 0.253 0.247 2.372% 
Voltage 0.988 0.997 0.910% 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for medium loading 
conditions at middle of feeder 
Middle of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.328 0.315 3.963% 
Reactive Power 0.159 0.152 4.088% 
Voltage 0.979 0.988 0.959% 
 
Table 4.10: Comparison of Measured and Simulated Quantities for medium loading 
conditions at end of feeder 
End of feeder 
Quantity Measured Value Simulated Value Percentage Error 
Active Power 0.056 0.053 4.571% 
Reactive Power 0.027 0.025 4.630% 
Voltage 0.971 0.986 1.451% 
It is concluded that the simulated values of real power, reactive power, and voltage match very 
well with the measured values, with an error less than 5%, which validates the EMTDC/PSCAD 
model of the Western campus for medium loading conditions. 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the electrical model of the Western campus has been validated in 
EMTDC/PSCAD software for three different loading conditions namely, peak load condition, 
medium load condition, and light load conditions. For each of these conditions the model is 
validated within some reasonable assumptions or limitations as discussed in section 4.3. For all 
three different loading conditions, the model is also validated at three different feeder locations. 
The validation has been performed for three quantities namely active power, reactive power, and 
voltage. For all of the cases studied, the error in the simulated quantities as compared to actual 
measured quantities is less than 5 %, which is considered acceptable. 
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Such a validated model as developed in this research work has never been attempted earlier at 
Western. Within the presented assumptions, this validated Western model can be used in the 
future for the following purposes: 
 To study the disaster events: This model can simulate different faults during any 
emergency situations and provide information on the available electrical power on the 
campus for meeting the needs of other infrastructures such as water pumps in the water 
network, various machines in the hospital, computers in data acquisition systems in the 
communication systems, etc. During the disaster management studies involving various 
infrastructures, it is important to have a validated electrical power model.  
 Installation of renewable energy resources: At Western, some photo-voltaic (PV) 
panels are already installed at the top of the Claudette MacKay-Lassonde Pavilion 
building (Green building). In the future, plans can be made to install more PV panels or 
other renewable generating sources across the campus. The validated electrical model can 
be used to perform feasibility studies of the installation of such renewable resources on 
Western’s campus. 
 Future expansion studies: Western is expanding its activities daily. Based on the 
demands of campus activities, it is necessary to build a new infrastructure at present, and 
in future. For example, a new building is being constructed for The Richard Ivey School 
of Business on Western Road. Also, a new construction site has been started behind Perth 
Hall residence. Keeping in mind construction of new buildings, it is necessary to get 
information about various power system components and availability of electrical power 
for these buildings. The validated system model can be used for both steady state and 
transient studies for future expansions of the Western campus. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISASTER SCENARIOS FOR INTERDEPENDENCY STUDIES 
5.1 Introduction 
The word disaster implies a sudden, overwhelming and unforeseen event [56]. At the household 
level, a disaster could result in a major illness, death, or substantial economic or social 
misfortune. At the community level, it could be a flood, a fire, a collapse of buildings in an 
earthquake, the destruction of livelihoods, an epidemic, or displacement through conflict. When 
occurring at district or provincial level, a large number of people can be affected. Most disasters 
result in the inability of those affected to cope without outside assistance.  
Thus, in order to deal with these disasters in a better way, it is necessary to prepare an emergency 
plan in advance. When preparing an emergency plan, it should be confirmed that all of the 
necessary infrastructures are included in the plan. This plan would be best if the coordination of 
all of the infrastructures such as power, water, steam, and communication systems is ensured. 
In earlier chapters, the concept of infrastructural interdependencies was presented in the context 
of natural disasters occurring around the world. The scope of the DR-NEP project was to define 
new alternatives to analyze, model, and manage disaster scenarios in the context of 
infrastructural interdependencies in an efficient manner, and in order to achieve its objective - 
maximum human survival during a disaster event. Within the scope of the DR-NEP project, the 
Western campus model is used to study interdependencies between various entities or lifelines of 
the campus and University Hospital. When performing an interdependency study on the Western 
campus, certain entities need to be selected from available infrastructures and specific disaster 
scenarios have to be designed and analyzed.  
This chapter deals mainly with the disaster scenario analysis based on the results from the 
electrical network case study. The subsections in the chapter explain in detail, the disaster 
scenario, critical subsystems (power systems), and the impact of appropriate decision making 
during these disasters on the overall workings of the Western campus. The disaster scenarios are 
simulated using PSS Sincal, which is a load flow software. The results from PSS Sincal generate 
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different values of the Quality of Service (QoS) indicator which are used for decision making 
during the disaster. The final results are presented in the following subsections. 
5.2 Electrical Network Case Study 
According to the scope of this research work, one of the physical entities chosen for detailed 
analysis is the electrical power system. The basics of the electrical power systems with respect to 
Western campus have already been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In support of the DR-NEP 
project, the disaster scenario was created with the inclusion of different physical entities such as 
electrical power, water, steam and condensate returns. However, in this thesis, only the electrical 
model case study has been presented with results. The electrical models were created in separate 
softwares EMTDC/PSCAD and PSS Sincal. The final results were fed manually into the 
infrastructural interdependency software I2Sim. The electrical network case study is discussed in 
brief with respect to the two softwares used.  
5.2.1 EMTDC/PSCAD Electrical Model 
The main purpose of the EMTDC/PSCAD electrical model was to make a validated electrical 
model of Western campus distribution systems. The validated model has already been presented 
with simulation results in Chapter 4. In Figure 5.1, the EMTDC/PSCAD model is presented only 
for the south substation. During DR-NEP project the focus of the disaster scenario is on the 
Physical Plant. The Physical Plant is close to the south substation and in normal times it gets 
incoming power supply from south substation. In case of any emergency, if the south substation 
has to be shut down, the other two substations in the campus can substitute for the south 
substation. In the process of substitution of power supply, it is likely that some of the buildings 
might need to be shut down due to insufficient amount of power available.  
Based on the disaster scenario, different fault conditions were created, such as connecting and 
disconnecting a number of buildings/loads to analyze different operating conditions in the 
presence of a disaster scenario. These fault conditions are created in PSS Sincal, and then on the 
basis of obtained results the information was used in I2Sim software. 
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Figure 5.1: EMTDC/PSCAD model for south substation of Western campus 
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5.2.2 PSS-Sincal Model 
To simulate the behaviour of a distribution/transmission network and perform load flow 
calculations, a power network simulator owned by Siemens, called PSS Sincal was integrated 
into the Simulators Layer at ENEA Italy. The electrical model made in EMTDC/PSCAD was 
already validated in the chapter 4. The same validated electrical model is now made in PSS 
Sincal, which is a load flow software. 
PSS Sincal allows user modelling and simulating the behaviour of different power networks. 
This software is used only to simulate the behaviour of the considered network which models a 
subset of the power distribution network of Western campus. Figure 5.2 presents the PSS Sincal 
model for Western campus. The data used for the PSS Sincal model is almost the same as the 
PSCAD model but with some additions. These additions were combining two buildings loads 
together in order to reduce the number of buildings in the PSS Sincal model. The data used in the 
model is presented in Appendix A. 
In PSS Sincal, the Western model is used to get the various load flow values at different buses in 
the network. The next step is to obtain the different values of Quality of Service (QoS) indicator. 
To get the Quality of Service value, a web application is used, which helps in implementing a 
web service that allows the performing of operations on a particular power network [50]. An 
explanation of the operations (methods) that may be invoked on the considered power network 
and the steps to invoke them are explained below. 
The calculation formulas for the QoS are explained in Section 2.6.3. A specific java 
programming code and procedure was followed to obtain different values of QoS for different 
load conditions. The value for QoS under normal conditions in PSS Sincal is 0.85, but as the 
lines are disconnected, the value of QoS decreases. The value of QoS should lie between 0 and 1. 
The procedure for changing the value of QoS is as follows [48][49]: 
i. QoS is approximately 0.85, as the majority of lines are connected.  
ii. All the available lines can be checked by calling the subroutine getLines().  
iii. The ID of each line can be seen by calling the above function.  
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Figure 5.2: PSS-Sincal model for Western campus  
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iv. Only distribution lines (no other components) can be disconnected by calling the 
subroutine setLineStatus ("LineID" , 0).  
v. To connect a distribution line again, “1”, instead of “0”, has to be written as a second 
parameter of the method. It is mandatory to call updateLines() after each operation of 
connection/disconnection.   
vi. The more lines that are disconnected, the less QoS value will be obtained.  
By using the above procedure, different values of QoS were generated based on the disaster 
scenario created. The number of distribution lines in PSS Sincal directly impacts the value of 
QoS. After obtaining the values of quality of service for different fault conditions, the next step 
was to integrate the results from PSS Sincal into the I2Sim model. 
5.3 Integrating Electrical Outputs with I2Sim 
In this section, the structure of the electrical power system infrastructure is presented along with 
its integration methodology with the infrastructure interdependency software I2Sim. As the 
overall study was based on the effect of infrastructure interdependency during disaster, only 
electrical power systems will be discussed which lies within the scope of this thesis work. To 
understand the overall structure of the power system and its integration with I2Sim, it is better to 
refer to Figure 5.3, which is a reduced block diagram of the Western test case model. Figure 5.3 
shows all of the major subsystems used in the Western test case during disaster events. It also 
presents information about the inputs and outputs of different subsystems.  
In the disaster scenarios, different entities were modelled using the I2Sim software. The study 
case and the objectives of the disaster scenario are explained in section 2.8. To integrate all of 
the available entities into I2Sim, different domain simulators were chosen. The description of all 
chosen domain simulators is explained in Section 2.6. The campus was divided into three parts; 
A1: central campus, A2: UCC and social science, and A3: south campus, which are denoted by 
three different blocks in Figure 5.3. Different inputs are provided to the buildings in the form of 
different entities such as water and power. 
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Figure 5.3: Reduced block diagram of Western test case model 
The output from the buildings is in the form of condensate return, which again goes to the feed 
water control and increases the amount of water available for usage. In terms of electrical power, 
the power house and different channels, or distribution lines, were built using I2Sim.  
Figure 5.4 presents the block diagram of power distribution methodology used in the I2Sim 
model. All of the different blocks represented in Figure 5.4 are explained below, in detail, to 
provide the complete picture of the electrical power system architecture used in the final I2Sim 
model. 
 The Power House: The power house block represents the cell in the I2Sim model which 
consists of substations and back-up generators. The input to the power house is the city’s 
electricity supply from London Hydro, which is at 27.6 kV. This block represents three 
different substations that supply power to the physical plant and to the entire Western 
campus. Physically, the output of the block is fed to all the buildings on campus, 
including the steam and water stations. Back-up generators are also included in the power 
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house cell model. The responsibility of the back-up generators is to provide power to the 
water station, steam station, and to some of the critical buildings on campus, in the 
absence of power input from the utility due to any faults, or during a disaster event. As 
the back-up generators are diesel generators, it is necessary to maintain a fixed amount of 
oil in reserve to be used in case of emergency. 
                 
Figure 5.4: Block diagram of power distribution methodology in I2Sim 
 PSS Sincal: The PSS Sincal block in Figure 5.4 represents the load flow software used to 
calculate the power flow values at different points in the electrical power network. The 
PSS Sincal block has been discussed in detail in Section 5.2.2. The input from the power 
house is fed into the PSS Sincal, and according to the availability of power from the 
power house, load flow calculations are performed and different points in the network are 
checked for power flow values for voltage, active, and reactive power availability. In   
PSS Sincal, different load flow values can be calculated for different events or scenarios 
and can be used to get valuable information about power availability at different points 
on the Western campus. The data used for modelling the network using PSS Sincal was 
the same as used in EMTDC/PSCAD. 
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 Quality of Service (QoS): QoS evaluator is the block that is connected to the output of 
the PSS Sincal block. The Quality of Service indicator, or evaluator, is used as a tool to 
indicate how the network is behaving in the event of an emergency. The value of the QoS 
evaluator is highest when the network is healthy. But when an emergency event is 
experienced, the lines in the electrical network have to be reduced or disconnected.  
The information from PSS Sincal is passed to the QoS, which calculates using the 
number of normal lines, overloaded lines, and critical lines (which always need electrical 
power). Accordingly, the decision maker disconnects the overloaded lines to obtain a new 
value of QoS, as well as a value of power actually available to be fed to the distributor 
block. For every load flow value change, a new value of QoS is generated, which gives 
the actual available power. Reduction of lines leads to the lowering of the value of QoS, 
which gives exact information about the healthiness of the network.  
 Power Distributor Control: This block has two inputs and one output which is fed into 
the power distributor. The inputs are received from the power house and QoS evaluator. 
The power house provides the information of the amount of power that is available from 
three substations on campus. The QoS gives an idea about available power after load 
flow calculations. In power distributor control, both inputs are compared and a final 
signal is sent to the power distributor with information about actual power distribution. 
During emergency situations, the final signal sent is based on the following criteria: 
i. The critical infrastructures get the required power on priority basis. 
ii. The power distribution for non-critical infrastructures can be compromised. 
 Power Distributor: A distributor is a block in the I2Sim model that is used to distribute 
entities (tokens) such as power, steam, and water through channels to various cells. In 
Figure 5.4, the distributor is used to distribute power, thus, it is named the power 
distributor. The power distributor is used to distribute available power to different 
buildings on campus. As the entire campus is divided into different cells, power is 
distributed to the physical plant and to the different buildings combined together, as 
different cells.  
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In the I2Sim model, the power distribution in the distributor can be done through three 
different mechanisms: Manual mode, Human Readable Table (HRT), or external mode.  
i. Manual mode: In this mode, the decision maker defines a single set of output 
ratios. These apply until changed by the decision maker. 
ii. HRT mode: In this mode, the output ratios of the distributor block are read 
from the Human Readable Table (HRT). Each Physical Mode (PM) contains a 
set of output ratios. By changing the PM, the user can change the output ratios 
available to the distributor.  
iii. External mode: In this mode, a number of input ports appear on the block. 
The decision maker can define the number of output ports using the number of 
outputs edit box. The number of the distribution factor port will be one less 
than the number of outputs, as the last factor is calculated internally. 
All three above stated distribution methods can be used. In this study for power 
distribution, the manual mode was used. Special care is taken to ensure that the Physical 
Plant always receives electrical power to generate the required amount of steam needed 
to sustain the campus activities. Thus in this work, the Physical Plant is considered to be 
a life critical system. 
 Physical Plant: The Physical Plant is the most important building to the Western 
community, as it has boilers installed for producing steam for the campus and University 
Hospital. During the winter, heating is the main priority for running any kind of business 
or educational institution. During the winter season at Western, the Physical Plant 
produces the required steam. The Physical Plant uses a combination of five of the 
installed boilers to produce steam. As such, during a disaster situation, it is necessary to 
keep the Physical Plant working to provide the necessary heating for the campus. The 
output of the Physical Plant is steam, for which it requires different types of inputs.  
In this thesis, the focus is on only one of the inputs to the Physical Plant: the electrical power 
input. In the I2Sim model, various distribution strategies were employed for electrical power to 
receive the best decision making scenarios in case of a disaster event. These are presented in 
Section 5.4. 
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5.4 Effects of Including Electrical Power as a Critical Entity  
Of all entities considered in the campus case study, the electrical power supply is the most 
important and critical entity. It is the most important as it is required by all of the other 
infrastructures, as input. This fact has been presented by using three different figures. Figure 5.3 
depicts the reduced block diagram of the Western test case model. Figure 5.5 presents the block 
diagram of the inside of a boiler. Figure 5.6 presents the diagram of a water pump with basic 
inputs. 
 
Figure 5.5: Block diagram of inside of a boiler 
In this research work, some studies are done that were not a part of the overall DR-NEP project. 
In the DR-NEP project results, electrical infrastructure was not included. However, electrical 
infrastructure has been included in this study. In this section, some of the differences are 
presented between the types of inputs used in this research and those that were not used as part of 
the DR-NEP project. 
Figure 5.5 depicts two different methods of producing steam. The first method gives output as 
Steam1. This output is based on three entities as input: electricity, fuel, and water. The second 
method gives output as Steam2. This method only takes water as input. The second method does 
not consider other critical entities such as electrical power or fuel. In this research work, the 
results are presented by following the first method of producing steam (taking electricity as a 
critical input), which has not been studied in the DR-NEP project. The objective of this research 
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work is to provide all of the information on the availability of electrical power during emergency 
situations. 
In Figure 5.6, water can be received as an output by using two different methods. The first 
method gives W1 as an output of the water pump, which takes two inputs: electricity and water. 
In the second method, the W2 output is obtained directly without using any other physical entity. 
In this research work, the first method (W1) of producing water is used, which was not used 
previously in the DR-NEP studies, as the information on electrical power infrastructure was not 
available.  
 
Figure 5.6: Diagram of a water pump with basic inputs 
From Figures 5.5 and 5.6, it is clear that the work done in this research study is totally based on a 
set of criteria that includes electricity as one of the critical inputs to all other subsystems. This 
work has not been done earlier as part of the DR-NEP project, and in fact, is a contribution of 
this thesis. 
5.5 Operating Scenarios with Collaboration 
Operating scenarios with collaboration means that different disaster scenarios will be presented 
for electrical power systems in collaboration with other entities such as water, steam, and 
condensate return. While presenting these operating scenarios, the effect of all of the 
interdependent entities is taken into consideration while searching for an optimal decision 
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making scenario. These operating scenarios are based on multiple infrastructures involved during 
a disaster event. 
To examine the interdependencies of infrastructures, this study has been done using the Western 
campus model created using the I2Sim software. Different entities such as electrical power, 
water, and steam were used as infrastructures. To study the interdependency and to determine an 
optimal operating scenario in case of a disaster, different operating scenarios were created using 
I2Sim. The overall model used in the study can be divided into two different categories. The first 
is the I2Sim model that was validated based on a real incident in 2006 on the Western campus. 
The second is the electrical model that has been developed in Chapter 3 and validated in Chapter 
4.  
To study the interdependency relationship between different infrastructures, three different 
operating scenarios were created with collaboration from other entities during the DR-NEP 
project. These three scenarios are created keeping in mind all of the entities used in the I2Sim 
model. However, in this section, the results and analysis will be presented from the point of view 
of one entity – electrical power, which is within the scope of the thesis at all times. The objective 
in these scenarios is to keep University Hospital operational at all times. Thus in these scenarios, 
priority is given to the Physical Plant, which produces steam that is supplied to University 
Hospital. The goal in the simulation study is to keep the electrical input to the physical plant 
above a certain threshold level and also to continue supply other campus activities. In the 
following subsections, different operating scenarios will be discussed, and the simulation results 
will be presented. 
The scenarios are selected on the basis of the overall objectives that are mentioned in Chapter 1. 
The scenarios were created to better analyze and understand different operating conditions in 
case of the occurrence of a disaster, and to find out which of the operating scenarios gives the 
most efficient results. 
5.5.1 Scenario 1 
This section presents Scenario 1, which is simulated and analyzed using I2Sim, to better 
understand the interdependency approach during critical emergency situations. In this scenario, a 
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fire starts in one of the buildings close to the west substation on the Western campus, followed 
by the opening of fire hydrants. 
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a fire starts in one of the buildings close to electrical 
substation, which leads to the immediate shutdown of the west substation. 
Due to the shutdown of the west substation, other substations become 
overloaded. 
 This is followed by a reduction in water pressure on campus due to the 
opening of fire hydrants.  
 At t=t0+190 minutes, water pressure returns to normal. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
In the above scenario, the objective is to determine the available electrical power supply by using 
both PSS Sincal and the Quality of service (QoS) evaluator, as described in Section 5.3 above. 
The power output given by the QoS evaluator guarantees that none of the distribution line is 
overloaded. The second objective is to provide a constant power supply to the Physical Plant and 
water pumping station. It is vital to supply electrical power to the Physical Plant whose output is 
steam, which is consumed by University Hospital, and all Western buildings. In this scenario the 
power to be supplied to the water pumps is combined with the Physical Plant input. Thus, the 
input to the Physical Plant represents the input of electrical power to both the water pumps and to 
the boilers in the Physical Plant.  
 Simulation Results 
In this scenario, due to a fire on campus, many variables or entities representing different 
infrastructures were changed. These variables are electrical power, water system, and other 
forms of water - steam and condensate return. The whole scenario is modelled for 225 minutes 
using I2Sim, with a time step of one minute. The fire starts at 120 minutes and the system returns 
to normal at 200 minutes. 
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Due to the disaster event, many variables are changed; but in this section, the focus is only on the 
results related to electrical power change. In this scenario, only the peak loading power model 
was used, of three different loading conditions models mentioned in Chapter 4. Based on any 
disaster event or emergency situation, the peak loading condition represents the worst case 
scenario, as it always represents scarcity of power and requires proper load management. 
The results of Scenario 1 are shown in Figures 5.7 to 5.9. Figure 5.7 depicts the electrical power 
sent to the physical plant and water pumps during Scenario 1, in the disaster study. 
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Figure 5.7: Scenario 1; Electrical power sent to physical plant and water pumps. 
In Figure 5.7, the power sent from the power house to the physical plant and all of the water 
pumps is shown. Physical plant is the building that contains all of the equipment used to produce 
steam. To produce steam, electrical power, water, and fuel are three required components. To 
provide water supply, electrical power is needed for the water pumps, condensate tanks, and 
condensate pumps. At t=t0, during peak loading conditions, the total power consumed by the 
physical plant and water pumping equipment is 1.76 MW. At t=t0+120, due to the closure of the 
west substation, the electrical power sent is decreased to 1.28 MW. At t=t0+200, the system is 
restored and electrical power increases to a normal output of 1.76MW. The availability of power 
values during the disaster events are calculated based on results from the PSS Sincal software 
and Quality of Service Evaluator, which is 0.85 in normal conditions. The amount of available 
power during the disaster period is enough to carry on the processes of the physical plant. 
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Figure 5.8 shows the electrical power sent to the different cells on the Western campus: A1, A2, 
and A3, as described in Section 2.8. According to the size of the cell, the distribution of electrical 
power has been done with the help of the distributor. In Figure 5.8, at t=t0, the electrical power 
values represent the peak loading condition of all the three cells, A1, A2, and A3. At t=t0+ 120, 
due to the closure of the west substation, the power sent to all buildings drops in proportion to 
the value of QoS. After the closure of the west substation, the QoS value drops from 0.85 to 
0.73. At t=t0+200, the west substation is turned on and the entire campus returns to a normal 
state. The availability of the electrical power during the disaster event is much more than the 
threshold values, therefore, the impact during this event can be considered minor.  
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Figure 5.8: Scenario 1; Electrical power sent to different parts of the campus 
Figure 5.9 presents the output of the physical plant as steam, measured in m
3
. The steam output 
of the Physical Plant is fed to University Hospital and the campus buildings. The output of the 
physical plant is directly related to one of its most important inputs: electrical power. 
Alternatively stated, the electrical input to the physical plant is based on its overall output, which 
is steam. Figure 5.9 shows the total steam output of the Physical Plant, out of which 15% is sent 
to University Hospital.  
In the I2Sim model, a steam output block was created by the DR-NEP team. Information about 
electrical power was generated from the Western electrical power model. The results obtained 
from the power systems model is fed into the I2Sim model to determine the steam output 
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presented in Figure 5.9. Initially, the steam output is normal, but at t=t0+ 120 minutes, the output 
of physical plant decreases following the shutdown of the west substation and the drop in water 
pressure. At t=t0+190, there is a small rise in steam output, as water pressure returns to normal. 
Finally, the steam output returns to its normal value with the turning on of the west substation.  
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Figure 5.9: Scenario 1; Output of Physical Plant based on different variables 
Action Plan: The output of the Physical Plant is considered to be a life critical system. In 
Scenario 1, the impact of the disaster event is not significant, as it does not have any major 
impact on the Western campus or hospital activities. All of the entities needed are available 
above the threshold values. In addition, the situation can be improved with the help of back-up 
generators, if needed.  
5.5.2 Scenario 2  
This section presents Scenario 2, which is simulated and analyzed using I2Sim to better 
understand the interdependency approach during a different disaster event. In Scenario 2, a fire 
starts in one of the buildings close to the south substation on the Western campus. There is a 
substantial difference in the west and south substations on campus. The south substation actually 
gets its power supply from London Hydro, but the west substation does not. Instead, it gets 
power from either the south or north substation. If the south substation is not operational, it 
implies that the probability of the west substation getting power during emergencies reduces to 
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half. In Scenario 2, the back-up generator is also used at some point, to compensate for the 
substation shutdown. 
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a fire starts in one of the buildings, which leads to 
the immediate shutdown of the south substation. Due to the shutdown of 
the south substation, the other substations become overloaded.  
 This is followed by a reduction in water pressure on campus due to the 
opening of fire hydrants.  
 At t=t0+130 minutes; back-up generators failed to start. Available power 
decreases further. 
 At t=t0+190 minutes, water pressure returns to normal. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
 
 Simulation Results 
The results for Scenario 2 are presented in Figures 5.10 to 5.12. Figure 5.10 depicts the amount 
of electrical power sent to the Physical Plant and water pumps, during the disaster study. The 
plots for Scenario 2 appear to be the same as in Scenario 1. In both scenarios, the total time of 
simulation is the same and the peak loading condition power model is used.  
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Figure 5.10: Scenario 2; Electrical power sent to Physical Plant and water pumps. 
92 
 
 
Thus, the initial conditions remain the same as in Scenario 1. In Figure 5.10, power sent to the 
Physical Plant and water pumps is shown. At t=t0+120, the power drops from its peak value to 
0.96 MW due to the shutdown of the south substation. At this point the QoS value drops from 
0.85 to 0.66. Such a low value of QoS indicates that there are a large number of overloaded 
distribution lines. Due to this overload, an attempt to start the back-up generators was initiated at 
t=t0+130, which was not successful. This led to further overload of the distribution system. 
Hence, after t=t0+130 ,the QoS value drops further and the amount of available power drops 
from 0.96 MW to 0.48 MW, which is below the threshold value for giving minimal output 
required to sustain activities on campus and the hospital. At t=t0+200 there is a rise in power as 
the south substation is turned back on. 
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Figure 5.11: Scenario 2; Electrical power sent to different parts of the campus 
Figure 5.11 shows the electrical power sent to the different cells on the Western campus: A1, A2, 
and A3, as described in Section 2.8. All of the conditions in Figure 5.11 remain the same as in 
Figure 5.10. Initially, all cells get maximum power supply, but during the disaster event, the 
power supply drops corresponding to the value of QoS, as evaluated in the previous paragraph. 
The amount of power available during the disaster event is below the threshold values and 
cannot sustain the campus activities. As the power available is substantially less, it will lead to 
evacuation of the majority of campus buildings. The remaining available power can then be 
distributed to the critical loads on the campus such as the Chemistry laboratory, buildings with 
animal care, etc.  
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As explained in Section 5.5.1, the output of the Physical Plant is directly related to one of its 
most important inputs: electrical power. It has been shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.11, that amount 
of electrical power is less than the threshold value. This has a direct impact on the output of the 
Physical Plant, as the amount of steam produced is proportional to the power available to the 
Physical Plant. Figure 5.12 shows the total steam output of the Physical Plant, out of which 15% 
is sent to University Hospital.  During the disaster event, the amount of steam produced is only 
about 20% of the total steam produced. In Figure 5.12, the amount of steam available for the 
hospital during the disaster event is 2000 cubic metres, which is substantially lower than 
threshold value required for supporting hospital and campus activities. 
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Figure 5.12: Scenario 2; Output of Physical Plant based on different variables. 
Action Plan: This scarcity of steam is due to the shortage of both electrical power and water. To 
cope with this situation, all of the resources should be redirected towards the life critical system, 
which is University Hospital. Instead of supplying power to the campus buildings, it should be 
redistributed to the Physical Plant and the campus should be evacuated as soon as possible. The 
buildings on campus with critical loads have to be supplied a proportion of the available power. 
This can be done by manually changing the distribution ratios of different distributors used in the 
I2Sim model. It can be done for all of the entities modelled in the case study to better support the 
critical cells and subsystems. 
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5.5.3 Scenario 3  
Scenario 3 is similar to Scenario 2, with a minor change. In Scenario 2, due to overload, an 
attempt to start the back-up generators was initiated to make-up for the shutdown of the south 
substation, but failed. In Scenario 3, the back-up generators were started successfully, which 
added some more MW of electrical power during the disaster event. Also, a hit and trial method 
has been used with the help of the distributor to distribute power to the Western campus to 
continue the campus activities and to avoid any disturbance to hospital activities.  
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a fire starts in one of the buildings, which leads to 
the immediate shutdown of the south substation. Due to the shutdown of 
the south substation, the other substations become overloaded.  
 This is followed by a reduction in water pressure on campus due to the 
opening of fire hydrants.  
 At t=t0+130 minutes, back-up generators are started successfully to meet 
the overload on electrical power substations. The amount of power 
available does not decrease further. 
 At t=t0+190 minutes, water pressure returns to normal. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
 
 Simulation Results 
Figure 5.13 depicts the electrical power sent to the Physical Plant and water pumps during the 
disaster study, in Scenario 3. In Figure 5.13, power reduction due to the shutdown of a substation 
is demonstrated for the Physical Plant and the water pumps during the period t0+120 to t0+200. 
Power availability decreases to 0.96 MW from 1.76 MW at the time instant of t0+120 minutes. 
Due to a reduction in power availability, the distribution system is overloaded, which was 
evident in the results of the load flow study in PSS Sincal, and the evaluation of the QoS. 
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Figure 5.13: Scenario 3; Electrical power sent to Physical Plant and water pumps. 
At t0+130 minutes, back-up generators were started immediately, to save further reduction of 
available power. Thus, after t0+130 minutes, the power sent to the Physical Plant and water 
pumps does not decrease further as seen in Figure 5.13. In contrast, the power sent to the 
physical plant is increased by a small amount, which was provided by the back-up generators. 
Figure 5.14 demonstrates the same processes as shown in Figure 5.13. The only difference is that 
power is sent towards different buildings of the campus instead of to the physical plant and water 
pumps. Power sent to all three cells (A1, A2, and A3) is above the threshold value and can 
sustain campus activities.  
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Figure 5.14: Scenario 3; Electrical power sent to different parts of the campus 
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There may still be a need to shut down some of the unused loads in non-critical and less crowded 
buildings. 
For Scenario 3, Figure 5.15 presents two types of steam outputs from the Physical Plant. The 
total steam output from the Physical Plant can be divided into the output of the plant sent to the 
hospital, and the remainder sent to the campus buildings. Initially, the Physical Plant provides a 
normal steam output until the fire starts in one of the buildings. 
 
Figure 5.15: Scenario 3, Output of physical plant based on different variables. 
At t0+120, the output of the Physical Plant decreases in the same way it decreased in Scenario 2, 
shown in Figure 5.12. Scenario 3 is different from Scenario 2 in that at time instant t0+130, the 
back-up generator kicked in immediately, thus increasing the available power as shown in 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14. As a result, the steam output does not decrease further as the electric 
power and water resources are available to produce enough steam for University Hospital and the 
campus buildings. When the disaster event is over, the steam output of the plant increases as the 
water supply becomes normal. The output returns to normal at t0+200, when the electrical power 
supply is restored as the south substation is switched on again. In this scenario, there is no need 
for evacuation. From Figures 5.13 to 5.15, it is shown that all campus and hospital activities can 
be continued, although at a reduced scale. 
Action Plan: Scenario 3 is an intermediate scenario, as compared to Scenarios 1 and 2. The 
available power supply and other resources are just adequate to carry on the activities of both the 
Western campus and the hospital. Depending upon the available power, a proper proportion for 
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the allotment of power has to be determined, so that both can be carried out on a reduced scale. 
A method is needed to determine the allotment of power resources required.  In terms of 
electrical power distribution, the load shedding and load flow techniques can be utilized for this 
purpose. In addition, a hit and trial method can also be used to determine the proportion of 
resources needed for different cells or subsystems. Once the proportion is known, it can be 
manually implemented with the help of distributors and electrical power distribution control 
systems.  
5.6 Operating Scenarios without Collaboration  
Operating scenarios without collaboration means that different disaster scenarios will be 
presented only for electrical power systems without collaboration with other entities like water, 
steam, and condensate return. While presenting these operating scenarios, the effect of electrical 
power quantities only is taken into consideration while searching for an optimal decision making 
scenario. These operating scenarios are based on a single infrastructure: electrical power 
systems. 
In Section 5.5, three operating scenarios were selected and were presented in collaboration with 
other entities (steam, water) to study the optimal decision-making processes during the disaster 
scenarios. From the viewpoint of power availability, two of the four substations were selected in 
the disaster scenarios. The action plan during the disaster event was based on the power 
availability and the output of the critical infrastructures. In order to do a complete analysis of 
power availability during a disaster scenario, the remaining two substations are selected for 
analysis in the section below. 
In this section, the north and east substations are selected for two different operating scenarios. 
These operating scenarios were framed to study the power availability during different disasters 
or faulty conditions. As the operating scenarios are framed without collaboration from other 
infrastructures, only the results related to electrical power systems will be presented. The 
objective is to perform a power availability analysis of the remainder of campus and to 
differentiate between the earlier disaster scenarios presented in Section 5.5. 
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5.6.1 Scenario I  
This section describes Scenario I, which is based on the results from PSS Sincal and the Quality 
of Service evaluator. The scenario is selected to analyze the power availability during an 
emergency event. In Scenario I, the east substation is selected as the main substation. A 
snowstorm is chosen to occur in London during the peak loading conditions in the campus. Peak 
loading conditions have been selected for the event as it represents the worst-case scenario.  
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a snow storm hits London, which leads to an outage 
of power on the east substation as the incoming feeder is cut down due to 
fallen trees. Due to the shutdown of the east substation, the other 
substations become overloaded.  
 At t=t0+130 minutes; back-up generators started, but did not kick in 
immediately. Available power decreases further. 
 At t=t0+140 minutes; the back-up generator kicks in. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
 
 Simulation Results 
In this section, the simulated results are presented for scenario I, which has been modelled for 
peak load conditions with the total load of 22 MW. The emergency event was simulated using 
PSS Sincal. The QoS value was then calculated by the QoS evaluator, to determine the available 
power entity. Figure 5.16 depicts the electrical power available for the Physical Plant and water 
pumps, in Scenario I. The QoS value for a healthy network is 0.85. In Figure 5.16 at t=t0+120, 
due to the disaster event, the available power decreases from 1.76 MW to 1.11 MW. During the 
calculation of the QoS it is found that more lines are overloaded and the entire network is under 
overload. As such, there is a need to get support from the back-up generators. At t=t0+130, the 
generators do not kick in immediately, leading to a decrease in electrical power from 1.11 MW 
to 0.8 MW, as shown in Figure 5.16.  
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After a lapse of 10 more minutes, at t=t0+140, the back-up generators were started successfully, 
which led to a reduction in load on the substations. This event resulted in the increase in overall 
power availability. 
Of the total power of 22 MW, almost 50% of the power is still available, which should be able to 
sustain both campus activities and the Physical Plant operations at a reduced level. To improve 
the situation, some of the less important buildings could be evacuated. Figure 5.17 depicts the 
electrical power available for the different cells (A1, A2 and A3) on the Western campus. 
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Figure 5.16: Scenario I; Electrical power available for Physical Plant and water pumps 
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Figure 5.17: Scenario I; Electrical power available for different parts of the campus 
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Figure 5.17 demonstrates the same processes as shown in Figure 5.16. The only difference is that 
power is sent towards different buildings of the campus instead of to the Physical Plant and water 
pumps.  
5.6.2 Scenario II 
In Scenario II, the basic disaster event remains the same as in the occurrence of a snowstorm. 
However, instead of affecting the east substation, the incoming feeder to the north substation 
experiences a power outage. The results are presented based on the simulation in PSS Sincal and 
available power information is provided by the Quality of Service evaluator. The information 
provided by the QoS evaluator is fed into the I2Sim model to obtain the simulation results for the 
availability of power across the entire campus. A description of scenario II is provided below: 
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a snowstorm hits London, which leads to the outage 
of power to the north substation as the incoming feeder is cut down due to 
fallen trees. Due to the shutdown of the north substation, the other 
substations become overloaded.  
 The west substation is connected to the south substation and does not have 
any direct impact from the north substation power outage. 
 At t=t0+130 minutes; back-up generators were started, and kicked in 
immediately. Available power does not decrease further. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
 
 Simulation Results 
In Scenario II, Figure 5.18 presents the results of the availability of power for the Physical Plant 
where the incoming power is not available to the north substation. The system runs in a normal 
state, until the emergency event starts at t=t0+120 minutes, which leads to the immediate 
shutdown of the north substation and reducing the total power available to around 11.5 MW. To 
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increase the available active power and to better meet the load demand, the back-up generators 
were started successfully at t=t0+130. Power available from back-up generators resulted in an 
increase of electrical power for the physical plant, from 0.89 MW to 0.99 MW, shown in Figure 
5.18. In Figure 5.18, during the disaster event, the available power for the Physical Plant is close 
to 1 MW, which is just above the threshold value required to produce the steam for the campus 
and University Hospital. At t=t0+200, the electrical power is restored back to normal. 
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Figure 5.18: Scenario II; Electrical power available for Physical Plant and water pumps 
Figure 5.19 presents the power availability for the different cells of the campus during the 
disaster event.  
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Figure 5.19: Scenario II; Electrical power available for different parts of the campus 
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The available power can be utilized in an efficient way. Some of the unnecessary loads can be 
reduced in each building, for example corridor lights and un-used computer labs. Thus, the 
available power can be utilized and the need for evacuating some of the buildings can be averted.  
5.6.3 Scenario III 
Scenario III is similar to Scenario II, using the snowstorm which causes the north substation to 
experience a power outage. The only difference is the connection of the west substation. The 
west substation is either connected to the north substation or the south substation. However, in 
this scenario the west substation is connected to the north substation. Thus, with the power 
outage of the north substation, the west substation is also out of power. There is another 
difference between Scenarios II and III, which is the kick in time of back-up generators. A 
detailed scenario description is provided below. 
 Scenario description 
 Month of the event: December 
 At initial stage t=t0; the whole system runs in a normal state. 
 At t=t0+120 minutes; a snowstorm hits London, which leads to the outage 
of power to the north substation as the incoming feeder is cut down due to 
fallen trees. Due to the shutdown of the north substation, the other 
substations become overloaded.  
 The west substation is connected to the north substation and is not getting 
incoming power as the north substation is experiencing an outage. 
 At t=t0+130 minutes; back-up generators were started, but did not kick in 
immediately. Available power decreases further. 
 At t=t0+150 minutes; the back-up generator kicks in. 
 At t=t0+200 minutes, electrical power is returned to normal. 
 
 Simulation Results 
Scenario III is similar to Scenario II, with a different starting time of the back-up generator. 
Initially the system runs in a normal state. At t=t0+120 minutes, the north substation shuts down 
as the incoming power supply is not available. The value of the QoS evaluator decreases from 
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0.85 to 0.36. Figure 5.20 illustrates the electrical power available for the Physical Plant and 
water pumps during Scenario III. In Figure 5.20, at t=t0+120 the available power decreases from 
1.76 MW to 0.8 MW. There is a total loss of 57% of total power. At t=t0+130, the available 
power drops further to 0.59 MW from 0.8 MW. At t=t0+150 minutes, the attempt to start the 
back-up generators was successful and the amount of power available was increased to 0.62 
MW, as shown in Figure 5.20. However, since the power available is still very low, it is not 
possible to sustain both hospital and campus activities together. In order to sustain the hospital 
operations and maintain a supply to the critical buildings on campus, it is necessary to evacuate 
the buildings on campus to divert the newly available power to the critical building loads such as 
the Physical Plant, water pumps, chemistry building, and animal care buildings, etc.  
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Figure 5.20: Scenario III, electrical power available for physical plant and water pumps 
Figure 5.21 shows the electrical power sent to the different cells on the Western campus: A1, A2, 
and A3, as described in Section 2.8. According to the size of the cell, distribution of electrical 
power has been done with the help of the distributor. In Figure 5.21, at t=t0, the electrical power 
values represent the peak loading condition of all three cells, A1, A2, and A3. At t=t0+ 120, due 
to the closure of the north and west substations, the power sent to all buildings drops in 
proportion to the value of QoS.  
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The total power available to campus during the disaster event after the support from back-up 
generators at t=t0+ 150 is around 7 MW, which is not sufficient to supply power to all of the 
campus buildings.  
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Figure 5.21: Scenario III, electrical power available for different parts of the campus 
Therefore, it is better to evacuate the campus as quickly as possible and distribute the newly 
available power to the critical buildings on campus. At t=t0+200, the substations are turned on 
and the entire campus returns to a normal state.  
5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, different disaster scenario events were created to formulate a new type of 
efficient decision making, while simulating multiple infrastructures in I2Sim to study 
interdependencies. This chapter presented the EMTDC/PSCAD model, the PSS Sincal model, 
and the integration of all simulators in the I2Sim model, with the major emphasis on electrical 
power simulation. The results of three different disaster events were presented under different 
emergency situations in collaboration with other entities (water and steam). The Western campus 
was divided into smaller cells, so that it is easier to relate different subsystems with one another. 
Three separate scenarios based on power infrastructure were analyzed and presented without 
collaboration from the steam and water networks. It has been shown that the availability of one 
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entity or resource has a direct impact on several other related entities. Redundancy of a particular 
cell, for example back-up generators, increases the overall robustness of the system. A major role 
is played by the distributor and distributor control block, which helps in the proper allocation of 
power resources. 
The results presented in this chapter are in addition to earlier work done under the DR-NEP 
project. The earlier work was done on three subsystems: steam, condensate return, and water. 
This work was restricted to three subsystems because electrical modelling information was not 
available. It is realized that every infrastructure needs electrical power input for its day-to-day 
operations, for example electrical water pumps in water networks, modems, routers in 
communications, and providing signals in transportation. In this chapter, the information on 
electrical networks is obtained through electrical power models and the results are presented by 
incorporating the effect of the electrical power, along with that of steam and water networks.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis deals mainly with the electrical power system modelling for the purpose of studying 
the interdependencies between multiple infrastructures. Electrical power, steam, and water 
systems are the three infrastructures involved in this work, but the predominant emphasis is on 
electrical power systems. While it is easy to prepare a disaster plan for a single infrastructure,  
various challenges are encountered in managing all the infrastructures together. The decision-
making during any emergency situation becomes quite complex when multiple infrastructures 
are involved, as all the infrastructures are dependent upon each other.   
This thesis presents the development of a detailed model of the electrical power system of 
Western campus. This is validated with actual measured data provided by the Western Facilities 
management. The electrical model is validated for different loading conditions and different 
feeder positions. The thesis further describes three different infrastructures involved in the 
Western campus case study under the DR-NEP project. The results from the validated electrical 
model are incorporated into the infrastructural interdependency software (I2Sim). A total of six 
disaster scenarios are studied; three involving the electrical power systems in collaboration with 
water and steam systems, and the other three involving only the electrical power system.  The 
study of interdependency during disasters is performed to generate a wiser decision making 
process that will lead to less economic damage and more human survival. The major conclusions 
drawn from the different system studies for the aforementioned topics are outlined in the 
succeeding subsections. 
6.2 Infrastructural Interdependencies 
In Chapter 2, the definitions, concepts, and understanding of interdependencies are presented. 
This chapter also provides details about various subsystems in different infrastructures, their 
interconnection techniques and methods of analysis. It presents a brief description of the 
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interconnecting software that is used to model infrastructure interdependencies.  It also gives a 
detailed description of the DR-NEP disaster case study for the Western campus. 
In studying the infrastructural interdependencies, three infrastructures were selected for the 
Western campus cases under the DR-NEP project. These three infrastructures are electrical 
power, steam, and water systems.  To better understanding the infrastructural interdependencies, 
these three subsystems are modelled using the infrastructural interdependency software I2Sim. 
The I2Sim architecture study is presented in detail along with the DR-NEP project architecture. 
Various studies are presented to illustrate the integration of domain simulators for all the three 
subsystems using I2Sim.  
The major emphasis of this thesis is on the mechanism for integrating the electrical power 
domain simulator into I2Sim. The results from the electrical domain simulator are used to obtain 
the Quality of Service (QoS) index. The QoS gives knowledge about power availability during 
different fault conditions. For a specific disaster condition, the information about the electrical 
domain simulator is fed into I2Sim in the form of a QoS value. The significance of electrical 
infrastructure in an overall interdependency study is also presented in this chapter. It is 
demonstrated that an electrical network study is the most crucial entity in the interdependency 
studies, as other infrastructures cannot function properly without electrical power supply.  
6.3 Electrical Power System Modelling 
Chapter 3 presents the basic concepts of the modelling of electrical power distribution systems.  
It also provides a description of all the major components of the electrical system of Western 
campus.   
This chapter further presents the criteria for choosing the appropriate software for modelling of 
electrical power systems. Two commercial softwares EMTDC/PSCAD and PSS Sincal are 
selected to develop the electrical power system model for the Western campus. The Western 
study system consists of four substations. Each substation comprises transformers, underground 
feeders, capacitor banks, and circuit breakers. The modelling concept of each and every 
component of the electrical systems is presented with respect to the EMTDC/PSCAD and PSS 
Sincal softwares. Finally, an overall electrical model of the actual Western campus is developed 
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for performing load flow studies and fault studies using PSS Sincal and EMTDC/PSCAD 
software, respectively.   
6.4 Electrical Model Validation 
Chapter 4 demonstrates a methodology for the validation of the electrical power distribution 
model for the Western campus developed in Chapter 3. The electrical power distribution model 
is built using EMTDC/PSCAD software. In EMTDC/PSCAD, a steady state analysis is 
performed on the electrical distribution model under reasonable assumptions.  
The actual data for validation is provided by Western Facilities Management. To validate the 
electrical power model, three different scenarios are selected for steady state analysis. These 
three scenarios are peak load conditions, light load conditions, and medium load conditions. For 
each of these three loading conditions, three different locations are selected for analysis: the start, 
middle, and end of the feeder. For all of the scenarios, load flow studies are performed. For each 
scenario, the simulated values for voltage, active power, and reactive power are recorded and 
compared with the actual measured values obtained from Western Facilities Management. The 
correlation of all three electrical quantities is done for all three locations of feeders, and for the 
three different loading conditions. It is shown that the values obtained from simulation studies 
are within 5% of the actual measured data.  This validates the electrical system model of the 
Western campus.  
It is emphasized that this validated model has been developed for the first time at Western and 
can be of great benefit to Western University to study the campus electrical networks for future 
projects and expansion of facilities. 
6.5 Case Studies of Disaster Scenarios  
Chapter 5 presents a detailed disaster scenario analysis based on the simulation studies 
conducted with the Western electrical system model. This chapter describes different disaster 
scenarios, performance of the critical subsystem (power system), and the impact of appropriate 
decision making during these disasters on the overall operation of the Western campus. In these 
studies, disaster scenarios covering each and every possibility are modelled with a special focus 
on power systems. 
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Different disaster scenarios are simulated using PSS Sincal, a load flow software. The results of 
the load flow studies using PSS Sincal generate different values of the Quality of Service (QoS) 
index, which are used in decision making during the disaster. The final electrical outputs from 
PSS Sincal and QoS evaluator are integrated into I2Sim. Different power distribution scenarios 
are created across the campus with the development of a power distribution methodology in 
I2Sim. The power distribution methodology is based on the functioning of the power house, PSS 
Sincal, QoS, power distribution control, and the power distributor.  
The results presented in this work are an important addition to the earlier work done under the 
DR-NEP project. The previous work was done on three infrastructures: steam, condensate return, 
and water. It was restricted to three subsystems only because electrical modelling information 
was not available earlier. It is, however, realized that every infrastructure needs electrical power 
input, for example electrical water pumps in water networks. In this chapter, the performance of 
the Western electrical power system is obtained through its validated model. Results of different 
operating scenarios are presented by incorporating the effects of the electrical power along with 
those of steam and water networks. 
On the basis of different operating scenarios, simulation studies are conducted using all of the 
different substations in the disaster events. These scenarios are simulated for electrical power 
systems with and without collaboration with other entities (water, steam, and condensate return). 
Similar results are obtained in all disaster scenarios. The conclusions based on the results of all 
of the different scenarios are presented below:  
 Decisions to reduce power consumption on campus by evacuating selected campus areas 
is effective in stabilizing steam in the University Hospital, but not in maintaining Western 
business continuity. 
 Decisions to change the power distribution ratio among the campus areas have no major 
impact on the hospital steam supply. Providing an optimal output from the Physical Plant 
requires all entities to be above threshold values. However, a change in the power 
distribution ratio among the campus areas has an effect on the working of buildings 
across campus. 
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 A decision to produce steam supply according to the power availability seems to be 
appropriate as this preserves continuity of both hospital and campus operations. 
 More case studies are required to pre-plan an efficient emergency disaster plan before an 
actual disaster occurs. 
6.6 Thesis Contributions 
The following are the main contributions of this thesis: 
 Development of a detailed electromagnetic transients model for the Western campus, 
which has been validated for three widely different loading scenarios at three different 
locations of the feeder. Such a model has been developed for the first time at Western 
University. This model can be used not just for studying disaster scenarios but also for 
planning of future electrical projects and expansion of facilities in the Western campus. 
 Presenting the concept of a Quality of Service evaluator through web services along with 
PSS Sincal, which provides knowledge about healthy and non-healthy conditions of a 
power network based on different disaster scenarios. 
 A detailed study is presented on the integration of electrical power networks with other 
infrastructures for studying interdependencies between multiple infrastructures. An 
extensive analysis of different decision making options based on six different disaster 
scenarios is provided. This will help in developing much better survival strategies during 
any potential future disasters.  
6.7 Future Work  
Some studies that could be undertaken in the future to further investigate the aforementioned 
issues, are described below: 
 A probabilistic based framework to assess the risk could be developed. 
 More physical entities can be added to this study system, such as communication systems 
and transportation systems, which will be more realistic 
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 The electrical model could be expanded to include more details, such as, transformers, 
critical fans, and rooms at the level of individual buildings. 
 The results from the QoS evaluator were fed manually into the I2Sim model; attempts 
could be made to do this automatically, using appropriate programming to save time in 
future. 
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Appendix A: Study System Data for Peak Loading 
Conditions for Chapter 4 
(Extracted from Facilities Management website) 
 
Data for the elements used in study system is shown below: 
A. Source Data 
System Base MVA =100 MVA 
Base Voltage = 27.6 kV 
B. Substation and Breaker Data 
Transformer at South substation = 10 MVA, Z = 6.3% 
Transformer at East substation = 7.5 MVA, Z = 6.3% 
Transformer at North substation = 7.5 MVA, Z = 6.3% 
C. Cables Data and Capacitor Bank Data 
Cables data presented here is in ohms per phase per mile 
Resistance = 0.134  
Reactance = 0.135  
Shunt capacitive reactance = 2410 
Capacitor bank at North substation Qc = 750 kVAR 
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D. Buildings/Load Data 
Peak Loading Conditions 
Serial 
Number 
Building Name Building ID KW rating KVAR rating Power Factor 
1.  Support Services 
Building 
218 
881.3777778 426.8512578 0.9 
2.  Clinical Skills - 53 25.6679 0.9 
3.  UCC - 556.1388889 269.3380639 0.9 
4.  Social Science - 1833.819444 888.1187569 0.9 
5.  SLB 050 124.540625 60.31502469 0.9 
6.  UC 1 72.76888889 35.24197289 0.9 
7.  UC Add 1 116.8425926 56.58686759 0.9 
8.  Physics Building 023 423.5416667 205.1212292 0.9 
9.  Kresge Building 011 73.63541667 35.66163229 0.9 
10.  Medical Sciences 
Building 
010 
670.3363636 324.6439009 0.9 
11.  Dental Sciences 013 614.1990741 297.4566116 0.9 
12.  Dental Sciences 
Addition 
013 
59.94791667 29.03277604 0.9 
13.  West Valley 
Building 
016 
942.2666667 456.3397467 0.9 
14.  Health Sciences 015 207.6759259 100.5774509 0.9 
15.  Natural Sciences 
Centre 
022 
293.8759259 142.3241109 0.9 
16.  Taylor Library 027 245.9814815 119.1288315 0.9 
17.  Chemistry Building 021 290.8259259 140.8469959 0.9 
18.  Chemistry 
Addition 
021 
171.6574074 83.13368241 0.9 
19.  Material Sciences 020 151.6666667 73.45216667 0.9 
20.  B & G - 395.75 191.661725 0.9 
21.  Collip Building 014 37.90740741 18.35855741 0.9 
22.  Western Sciences 
Building 
028 
417.1990741 202.0495116 0.9 
23.  Middlesex College 002 214.0324074 103.6558949 0.9 
24.  Biotron 026 572.3240741 277.1765491 0.9 
25.  Visual Arts 
Building 
035 
216.7407407 104.9675407 0.9 
26.  North Campus 
Building 
034 
389.9166667 188.8366417 0.9 
27.  Staging Building 080 74.36574074 36.01532824 0.9 
28.  Talbot College 003 488.75 236.701625 0.9 
29.  Music Building 007 150.8240741 73.04409907 0.9 
30.  NCMRD - 234.8002245 113.7137487 0.9 
31.  Ivey - 276.762963 134.036303 0.9 
118 
 
 
32.  Somerville House 055 246.9259259 119.5862259 0.9 
33.  Thames Hall  123.1990741 59.66531157 0.9 
34.  Services Building 051 106.9123377 51.77764513 0.9 
35.  South Valley - 237.5324074 115.0369449 0.9 
36.  Power Plant - 288.1298701 139.5412961 0.9 
37.  Alumni Hall 060 195.9305556 94.88916806 0.9 
38.  SEB 031 654.0648148 316.7635898 0.9 
39.  CMLP 074 70 33.901 0.9 
40.  TEB 064 474.395 229.7494985 0.9 
41.  Recreation Centre 217 722.6388889 349.9740139 0.9 
42.  Perth Hall - 463.1666667 224.3116167 0.9 
43.  Elborn College 039 470.9027778 228.0582153 0.9 
44.  Law Building 037 148.5925926 71.96339259 0.9 
45.  Weldon Library 058 599.1820988 290.1838904 0.9 
46.  Student Services 058 117 56.6631 0.9 
47.  Lambton Hall 088 233 112.8419 0.9 
48.  Bayfield Hall 089 633 306.5619 0.9 
49.  Beaver Hall 091 189 91.5327 0.9 
50.  Saugeen Maitland 
Hall 
093 
755 365.6465 0.9 
51.  Sydenham 097 222 107.5146 0.9 
52.  Elgin Hall 081 371 179.6753 0.9 
53.  Delaware Hall 095 888 430.0584 0.9 
54.  Sebandrake - 1 0.4843 0.9 
55.  Graphic & A 220 390 188.877 0.9 
56.  LHB - 377 182.5811 0.9 
57.  Wind tunnel 032 410 198.563 0.9 
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Appendix B: Study System Data for Light Loading 
Conditions for Chapter 4  
Light Loading Conditions 
Serial 
Number 
Building Name Building ID KW Rating KVAR rating Power Factor 
1.  Support Services 
Building 
218 
528.4673089 255.9367177 0.9 
2.  Clinical Skills - 31.77839069 15.39027461 0.9 
3.  UCC - 333.4565829 161.4930231 0.9 
4.  Social Science - 1099.543977 532.5091479 0.9 
5.  SLB 050 74.67359695 36.164423 0.9 
6.  UC 1 43.6316638 21.13081478 0.9 
7.  UC Add 1 70.05791617 33.9290488 0.9 
8.  Physics Building 023 253.9523124 122.9891049 0.9 
9.  Kresge Building 011 44.15122717 21.38243932 0.9 
10.  Medical Sciences 
Building 
010 
401.9285068 194.6539758 0.9 
11.  Dental Sciences 013 368.2690215 178.3526871 0.9 
12.  Dental Sciences 
Addition 
013 
35.94430787 17.4078283 0.9 
13.  West Valley 
Building 
016 
564.9758164 273.6177879 0.9 
14.  Health Sciences 015 124.5208814 60.30546284 0.9 
15.  Natural Sciences 
Centre 
022 
176.2057357 85.33643778 0.9 
16.  Taylor Library 027 147.4885966 71.42872735 0.9 
17.  Chemistry Building 021 174.3769792 84.45077103 0.9 
18.  Chemistry 
Addition 
021 
102.9244558 49.84631395 0.9 
19.  Material Sciences 020 90.93816205 44.04135188 0.9 
20.  B & G  237.2886437 114.9188902 0.9 
21.  Collip Building 014 22.72898873 11.00764924 0.9 
22.  Western Sciences 
Building 
028 
250.1493429 121.1473268 0.9 
23.  Middlesex College 002 128.3321786 62.15127408 0.9 
24.  Biotron 026 343.1610949 166.1929183 0.9 
25.  Visual Arts 
Building 
035 
129.9560743 62.93772679 0.9 
26.  North Campus 
Building 
034 
233.7910221 113.224992 0.9 
27.  Staging Building 080 44.58912384 21.59451268 0.9 
28.  Talbot College 003 293.0507255 141.9244664 0.9 
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29.  Music Building 007 90.43295004 43.7966777 0.9 
30.  NCMRD - 140.7844013 68.18188554 0.9 
31.  Ivey - 165.9449352 80.36713213 0.9 
32.  Somerville House 055 148.0548782 71.70297753 0.9 
33.  Thames Hall - 73.86921338 35.77486004 0.9 
34.  Services Building 051 64.10381201 31.04547615 0.9 
35.  South Valley - 142.4225971 68.97526377 0.9 
36.  Power Plant - 172.760445 83.6678835 0.9 
37.  Alumni Hall 060 117.478448 56.89481236 0.9 
38.  SEB 031 41.97145941 189.9290022 0.9 
39.  CMLP 074 284.4435784 20.32677779 0.9 
40.  TEB 064 433.288697 137.756025 0.9 
41.  Recreation Centre 217 277.7111564 209.841716 0.9 
42.  Perth Hall - 282.3496689 134.4955131 0.9 
43.  Elborn College 039 89.09497098 136.7419446 0.9 
44.  Law Building 037 359.2649591 43.14869444 0.9 
45.  Weldon Library 058 70.15229644 173.9920197 0.9 
46.  Student Services 058 139.7050006 33.97475717 0.9 
47.  Lambton Hall 088 379.5419115 67.65913179 0.9 
48.  Bayfield Hall 089 113.3229404 183.8121477 0.9 
49.  Beaver Hall 091 452.6921693 54.88230004 0.9 
50.  Saugeen Maitland 
Hall 
093 
133.1094855 219.2388176 0.9 
51.  Sydenham 097 222.4487349 64.46492385 0.9 
52.  Elgin Hall 081 532.4379422 107.7319223 0.9 
53.  Delaware Hall 095 0.599592277 257.8596954 0.9 
54.  Seiban-drake - 233.8409881 0.29038254 0.9 
55.  Graphic & A 220 226.0462885 113.2491906 0.9 
56.  LHB - 245.8328337 109.4742175 0.9 
57.  Wind tunnel 032 528.4673089 119.0568413 0.9 
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Appendix C: Study System Data for Medium Loading 
Conditions for Chapter 4 
Medium Loading Conditions 
Serial 
Number 
Building Name Building ID KW Rating KVAR rating Power Factor 
1. Support Services 
Building 
218 
704.8378089 341.3529508 0.9 
2. Clinical Skills - 42.3841 20.52661963 0.9 
3. UCC - 444.7442694 215.3896497 0.9 
4. Social Science - 1466.50541 710.2285699 0.9 
5. SLB 050 99.59513781 48.23392524 0.9 
6. UC 1 58.19328044 28.18300572 0.9 
7. UC Add 1 93.4390213 45.25251801 0.9 
8. Physics Building 023 338.7062708 164.035447 0.9 
9. Kresge Building 011 58.88624271 28.51860734 0.9 
10. Medical Sciences 
Building 
010 
536.06799 259.6177276 0.9 
11. Dental Sciences 013 491.1749995 237.8760523 0.9 
12. Dental Sciences 
Addition 
013 
47.94034896 23.217511 0.9 
13. West Valley 
Building 
016 
753.5306533 364.9348954 0.9 
14. Health Sciences 015 166.078438 80.43178751 0.9 
15. Natural Sciences 
Centre 
022 
235.012578 113.8165915 0.9 
16. Taylor Library 027 196.7113907 95.26732654 0.9 
17. Chemistry Building 021 232.573493 112.6353426 0.9 
18. Chemistry 
Addition 
021 
137.2744287 66.48200582 0.9 
19. Material Sciences 020 121.2878333 58.73969768 0.9 
20. B & G - 316.481275 153.2718815 0.9 
21. Collip Building 014 30.3145537 14.68133836 0.9 
22. Western Sciences 
Building 
028 
333.6340995 161.5789944 0.9 
23. Middlesex College 002 171.1617162 82.89361916 0.9 
24. Biotron 026 457.687562 221.6580863 0.9 
25. Visual Arts 
Building 
035 
173.3275704 83.94254233 0.9 
26. North Campus 
Building 
034 
311.8163583 151.0126623 0.9 
27. Staging Building 080 59.47028287 28.80145799 0.9 
28. Talbot College 003 390.853375 189.2902895 0.9 
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29. Music Building 007 120.614012 58.41336603 0.9 
30. NCMRD - 187.7697395 90.93688484 0.9 
31. Ivey - 221.3273415 107.1888315 0.9 
32. Somerville House 055 197.466663 95.63310487 0.9 
33. Thames Hall - 98.52229954 47.71434967 0.9 
34. Services Building 051 85.49779643 41.40658281 0.9 
35. South Valley - 189.9546662 91.99504484 0.9 
36. Power Plant - 230.4174571 111.5911745 0.9 
37. Alumni Hall 060 156.6856653 75.88286769 0.9 
38. SEB 031 523.0556324 253.3158428 0.9 
39. CMLP 074 55.979 27.1106297 0.9 
40. TEB 064 379.3736815 183.730674 0.9 
41. Recreation Centre 217 577.8943194 279.8742189 0.9 
42. Perth Hall - 370.3943833 179.3819998 0.9 
43. Elborn College 039 376.5809514 182.3781548 0.9 
44. Law Building 037 118.8294963 57.54912506 0.9 
45. Weldon Library 058 479.1659244 232.0600572 0.9 
46. Student Services 058 93.5649 45.31348107 0.9 
47. Lambton Hall 088 186.3301 90.23966743 0.9 
48. Bayfield Hall 089 506.2101 245.1575514 0.9 
49. Beaver Hall 091 151.1433 73.19870019 0.9 
50. Saugeen Maitland 
Hall 
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603.7735 292.4075061 0.9 
51. Sydenham 097 177.5334 85.97942562 0.9 
52. Elgin Hall 081 296.6887 143.6863374 0.9 
53. Delaware Hall 095 710.1336 343.9177025 0.9 
54. Seiban-drake - 0.7997 0.38729471 0.9 
55. Graphic & A 220 311.883 151.0449369 0.9 
56. LHB - 301.4869 146.0101057 0.9 
57. Wind tunnel 032 327.877 158.7908311 0.9 
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Appendix D: Length of Cables used in Chapter 4 
(Calculated using AutoCAD map from Physical Plant website) 
Serial Number Building 1 Building 2 Distance (meters) 
    
1. ESS Natural Science 208 
2. ESS Natural Science 208 
3. ESS Visual Arts 206 
4. ESS Delaware 445 
5. ESS Biotron 100 
6. ESS Science Lib 2 206 
7. Delaware Elgin 326 
8. Sydenham Elgin 104 
9. Sydenham Medway 122 
10. Staging Middlesex 156 
11. Staging North Campus 96 
12. Visual Arts North Campus 74 
13. Material science Biotron 74 
14. Material science Chemistry 79 
15. Natural Science Chemistry 137 
16. Natural Science Natural  Science Add 25 
17. Science Lib 2 Natural  Science Add 45 
18. Natural Science Chiller Natural  Science Add 25 
19. Chemistry Add Natural  Science Add 20 
20. Chemistry Add Science lib 1 68 
21. NSS Science lib 2 262 
22. NSS West valley 50 
23. NSS Medical Science 244 
24. NSS SLB 374 
25. NSS Alumni Hall 730 
26. NSS Saugeen 162 
27. NSS Lambton 200 
28. NSS ESS 500 
29. NSS WSS 300 
30. West Valley Dental ADD 70 
31. Dental Dental ADD 38 
32. Dental Health Add 55 
33. Medical Science Health Add 93 
34. Law SLB 313 
35. Law SSS 164 
36. SLB Somerville 58 
37. Ivey Somerville 72 
38. Ivey UC 76 
39. SLB UC 92 
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40. Medical Science Weldon 322 
41. Medical Science Kresge 76 
42. Weldon Student Service 55 
43. Weldon SSS 320 
44. LHB SSS 90 
45. CMLP SSS 122 
46. SEB SSS 185 
47. Heating ADD SSS 40 
48. Heating SSS 40 
49. Heating Heating ADD 20 
50. Heating Music 250 
51. Heating Alumni hall 30 
52. SSS ESS 850 
53. Music Talbot 90 
54. Alumni house Talbot 740 
55. Alumni house Medway 136 
56. Western Science Middlesex 85 
57. Western Science Collip 40 
58. Western Science Physics 130 
59. SLB Physics 145 
60. Collip Kresge 190 
61. Elborn college Wind tunnel 185 
62 Elborn college SEB 270 
63. Rec centre Wind tunnel 142 
64. Rec centre TEB 155 
65. CMLP TEB 58 
66. Lambton Support Service 382 
67. Bayfield Support Service 371 
68. Bayfield Beaver 88 
69. Saugeen Beaver 93 
70. WSS SSC 84 
71. WSS UCC 50 
72. WSS SSS 565 
73. WSS NSS 500 
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Appendix E: MATLAB code used in Chapter 4 
i. Code for generating graph for actual data 
clc 
clearall 
closeall 
x1=xlsread('SS_data.xlsx'); 
y=x1(:,1); 
Ess=x1(:,2)/1e3; 
Nth=x1(:,3)/1e3; 
Sth=x1(:,4)/1e3; 
t=y/288; 
 
t1=3; 
t2=10; 
figure(1) 
plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Ess(288*t1:288*t2),'r'), hold on 
plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Sth(288*t1:288*t2),'b'), hold on 
plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Nth(288*t1:288*t2),'k'), legend('East 
Substation','SouthSubstation','North Substation') 
Ys=Ess(288*t1:288*t2)+Sth(288*t1:288*t2)+Nth(288*t1:288*t2); 
gridon 
title('Actual Measured Individual Active Power') 
xlabel('Days') 
ylabel('Power (MW)') 
figure(2) 
plot(t(288*t1:288*t2), Ys) 
gridon 
title('Actual Measured Total Active Power') 
xlabel('Days') 
ylabel('Power (MW)') 
 
% plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),smooth(Ess(288*t1:288*t2)),'r'), 
 
ii. Code for transferring data from PSCAD to MATLAB and generating graphs for 
simulated data 
clc 
clearall 
closeall 
% x1=xlsread('SS_data.xlsx'); 
T1=importdata('load_01.out'); % Calling of the variables assigend to T1... 
% y=x1(:,1); 
% Ess=x1(:,2)/1e3; 
% Nth=x1(:,3)/1e3; 
% Sth=x1(:,4)/1e3; 
% t=y/288; 
%  
% t1=10; 
% t2=17; 
% figure(1) 
% plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Ess(288*t1:288*t2),'r'), hold on 
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% plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Sth(288*t1:288*t2),'b'), hold on 
% plot(t(288*t1:288*t2),Nth(288*t1:288*t2),'k'), 
legend('East','North','South') 
% Ys=Ess(288*t1:288*t2)+Sth(288*t1:288*t2)+Nth(288*t1:288*t2); 
 
figure(2) 
% plot(Ys), hold on 
plot(T1(:,7),'r') 
title('Total Active Power consumption during Peak Loading') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Active Power (MW)') 
 
% E1=Ess(288*t1:288*t2); 
figure(3) 
% plot(E1), hold on 
plot(T1(:,4),'r') 
title('East Substation Active Power consumption during Peak Loading') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Active Power (MW)') 
 
% S1=Sth(288*t1:288*t2); 
figure(4) 
% plot(S1), hold on 
plot(T1(:,9),'r') 
title('South Substation Active Power consumption during Peak Loading') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Active Power (MW)') 
 
% N1=Nth(288*t1:288*t2); 
figure(5) 
% plot(N1), hold on 
plot(T1(:,2),'r') 
title('North Substation Active Power consumption during Peak Loading') 
xlabel('Time') 
ylabel('Active Power (MW)') 
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Appendix F: Western Campus map in AutoCAD 
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